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April 9, 1968

Secret Speech by Leonid I. Brezhnev CPSU CC Plenum, 'About Current Problems of the International Situation and the Struggle of the CPSU for the Cohesion of the World Communist Movement'

An excerpt on Cuba from Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev's secret speech, “About Current Problems of the International Situation and the Struggle of the CPSU for the Cohesion of the World Communist Movement,” to the CPSU CC Plenum on 9 April 1968.

September 8, 1983

CPSU CC Politburo Session, Korean Air Flight 007

Minutes from a Soviet Politburo meeting discussing the South Korean flight KAL 007 which was shot down by a Soviet interceptor on September 1, 1983.

November 19, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation between Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka and British Journalist David Astor, 19 November 1962 (excerpt)

Polish leader Władysław Gomułka and British journalist David Astor discuss the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

December 8, 1986

Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Resolution, on the Expiration of the Soviet Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Draft resolution with instructions for announcing the expiration of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing on 1 January 1987.

December 8, 1986

Proposal on the Expiration of the Unilaterial Soviet Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Proposal to resume Soviet nuclear testing following the expiration of the USSR's unilateral moratorium on nuclear detonations on 1 January 1987. The US government continued nuclear testing throughout 1986 and did not join the Soviet moratorium. Proposes to announce the resumption of testing in December 1986 following the first American test explosion in 1987.

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

November 16, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63

According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.

October 27, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 62

Protocol 62 illustrates how it was Khrushchev who raised the stakes during the missile crisis and dictated a new letter to Kennedy indicating he would only remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange of the United States withdrawing its military bases from Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistan demand would later be dropped, however and the US would only agree to remove its IRBMs from Turkey.

Pagination