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Documents

March 29, 1953

Ciphered Telegram from Kuznetsov and Fedorenko

Report that Kim Il Sung agrees that it is time to bring the war to an end, if not through military means than through negotiations.

September 27, 1958

Letter, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communist Party, on the Soviet Union's Readiness to Provide Assistance to China in the Event of an Attack

In the wake of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Soviet Union promises to intervene in the event of a nuclear attack on China from the United States.

January 6, 1961

From the Journal of S. V. Chervonenko, Record of Conversation with Mao Zedong on 26 December 1960

Ambassador Chervonenko records an unexpected and surprisingly warm meeting with Mao in which the leader talks about his lessened role in the Chinese government.

October 27, 1962

Cable, Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Meeting with Robert Kennedy

March 4, 1977

Letter, President Carter to Secretary Brezhnev

March 15, 1977

Letter, Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter

March 15, 1977

Letter, Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter

March 21, 1977

Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Dobrynin with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, records his discussions with US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about SALT II negotiations.

June 4, 1946

Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to China A.A. Petrov with Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Shijie, 1 June 1946

Wang Shijie presented a draft of suggestions from the Chinese side about economic collaboration in Manchuria, as a proposal. This includes common mine excavations and the Chinese right to use Japanese enterprises in the former occupied Manchuria until the disagreement over the distribution of enemy property confiscated during the war was settled.

November 22, 1956

Diary of Soviet Ambassador P.F. Yudin, Memorandum of Conversation with Liu Shaoqi of 30 October 1956

Liu Shaoqi discusses the potential withdrawal of Soviet advisors from China. Although the Chinese government was considering sending back some specialist, they did not want the abrupt removal of all specialists as happened in Yugoslavia. Liu Shaoqi also brings up the 1956 uprisings in Hungary and Poland, saying that such events were a “useful lesson for the entire communist movement.”

Pagination