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Documents

September 23, 1950

CPSU Politburo Decision to Adopt the Attached Draft Response

Telegram telling Vyshinsky to inform Lancaster that Malik consented to a meeting with the assistant Ahesona or one of the American ambassadors, as suggested by Lancaster. Malik should listen to the State Department official and if it's evident that the Americans are taking a step forward towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, tell him that Malik should ponder the issues mentioned in the conversation.

September 2, 1950

CPSU Politburo Decision on the Secret Archives of the Syngman Rhee Government

Decision to entrust Vyshinsky to print in the Soviet press the documents found in the archives of the Syngman Rhee government, seized when the communists took Seoul.

July 7, 1952

Cable, Vyshinsky to Molotov

Vyshinsky reports the proposals of a Chinese-Korean delegation concerning an armistice in Korea and Korean POW's.

October 1, 1950

Telegram from Vyshinsky

Kiselev's mistakes during the discussion of Korean issue is reported.

May 30, 1950

Cable Nos. 408-410, Shtykov to Vyshinsky (for the Politburo)

Terenti Shtykov reports on Kim Il Sung's military planning for an invasion of South Korea and signals Soviet approval for the invasion.

December 7, 1950

VKP(b) CC Politburo decision with approved message to Vyshinsky in New York

Message to Vyshinsky that U.S. proposals for a ceasefire should not be accepted as they are negotiating from a position of weakness after several defeats.

September 3, 1949

Telegram, Tunkin to Vyshinsky

Kim Il Sung, having recieved intelligence suggesting South Korea intended to seize the Ongjin Peninsula, requests Soviet permission to move further into South Korea.

January 19, 1950

Telegram Shtykov to Vyshinsky on a Luncheon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK

Shtykov reports a meeting with Kim Il Sung, along with Chinese and Korean delegates. Kim Il Sung expresses his view on the prospect of a liberation of the South Korean people that is to follow the Chinese success in liberation. Kim expresses his view that the South Koreans support his cause for reunification which the South Korean government does not seem to purse, and that he desires to ask Stalin for permission on an offensive action on South Korea.