USSR Ambassador to Cuba, A.I. Alekseyev, briefly reports about Fidel Castro's recent visit to the Soviet Union, which is viewed by most as a success. Alekseyev also mentions several conversations with other Cuban leaders about Castro's visit.

Castro attends a demonstration of new Soviet machinery for sugar harvesting and makes suggestions for improvement. Members of the National Leadership of the Cuban Communist Party were also present.

A description of North Korea's close and supportive relationship with Cuba.

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."

A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

Report on a conversation between Fidel Castro and Soviet representatives. Castro believed that revolutionary situation has developed in all Central American countries (except Mexico) and a few South American countries. In his opinion, a slight push in the form of armed actions by partisans would rally the peasant masses and bring about regime change. The report also discussed Havana's low opinion of many Latin American Communist Parties. Cuba's bypassing these parties in interfering in the respective countries' affairs worsened the relations between them and Havana.

Report on the American effort to spread false rumors about the arrival of Soviet military equipments and personnel in Cuba. To counter this subversive attempt, the Cuban security organs has established full control of foreign correspondence and captured maps and intelligence reports.