Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.

Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.

Gromyko reported on his meeting with Kennedy. The Soviet representative argued that Cuba was never a threat to the US and Washington should end its hostile activities against Havana. He also warned Kennedy of the possibility of nuclear war in the event of an invasion of Cuba. Gromyko reiterated the Moscow's intention of supporting Cuba only in economic and defensive issues. Kennedy, however, pointed out that it was difficult to explain the surge in Soviet military aid to Cuba. The US president reaffirmed that Washington did not have any plan to invade Cuba, at least after Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose. The US was only preventing actions that could have led to war. Gromyko reemphasized the peaceful rivalry of the two ideological systems and proposed a meeting between the two leaders.

Alekseev reports to the Foreign Ministry about Castro’s dissatisfaction about not being consulted regarding the question of dismantling. Alekseev shows him some letters that passed between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

Dobrynin sends the results of a meeting with Robert Kennedy, during which Dobrynin clears up a “misunderstanding” between the Soviets and Americans and the two discuss American surveillance planes taking fire over Cuba.

Response to Alekseev’s telegram regarding Fidel Castro’s doubts as to the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of letters.

Soviet response to the new UN proposal based on the US and Soviet government’s approval. They also discussed a proviso in U Thant's first address forbidding ships arriving in Cuba from carrying weaponry, a new American proposal and the Soviet inability to discuss actions to be taken on Cuban territory.

U Thant’s response to Khrushchev’s reply to his previous message. U Thant expresses satisfaction to Khrushchev and Kennedy’s responses to his previous messages.

A message from Gromyko to Alekseev to relay a message to Castro regarding American invasion.