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August 3, 1961

Walter Ulbricht's Speech at the Moscow Conference, 3-5 August 1961

Ulbricht speaks at the Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty.

October 5, 1960

Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 5 October 1960

Pak Seong-cheol discusses the relationship between the protest movement in South Korea and the reunification of the Korean Peninsula as well as North Korea's invitation to Khrushchev to attend the Supreme People's Assembly in October 1960.

February 25, 1956

Khrushchev's Secret Speech, 'On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,' Delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

In a secret speech before a closed plenum of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s cult of the personality. In addition, he revealed that Stalin had rounded up thousands of people and sent them into a huge system of political work camps (Gulags). This revelation was met with astonishment by many present for the speech, but helped to break the power that Stalin still held over the country.

August 3, 1960

Note from USSR Embassy to the USA Relayed by Gromyko to Khrushchev, 'John Fitzgerald Kennedy - Political Character Sketch'

Andrei Gromyko forwards to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy.

October 30, 1962

Minutes of Conversation between the Delegations of the CPCz and the CPSU, The Kremlin (excerpt)

In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

March 12, 1962

Alexei Adzhubei's Account of His Visit to Washington to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law and the editor-in-chief of Izvestia, reports on his meetings with US journalists and officials in Washington, DC. Especially significant was his 30 January meeting with President John F. Kennedy in which Kennedy compared the communist revolution in Cuba with the 1956 Hungarian Revolution suppressed by the Soviet Union. Adzhubei also described Kennedy's comments on German reunification.

October 1964

The Polyansky Report on Khrushchev’s Mistakes in Foreign Policy, October 1964

Excerpt from a report prepared by Politiburo member Dmitry Polyansky on Khrushchev's foreign policy mistakes, presented at 14 October 1964 CPSU Central Committee plenum. Polyansky included a scathing denunciation of Khrushchev’s “adventurism” in sending the missiles to Cuba, causing the “deepest of crises [that] brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war.” Ridiculing Khrushchev’s claims of having achieved a successful “penetration” of Latin America, Polyansky dismissed his contention that the crisis had in fact ended with a Soviet victory.

November 11, 1962

Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

Pagination