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Documents

October 30, 1956

Cable from Italian Communist leader Togliatti on Imre Nagy's Hungary

Cable from Togliatti to Soviet leadership expressing worries that Hungary under Nagy is moving in a reactionary direction that could damage unity of leadership of the Party

October 31, 1956

Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti

Draft telegram from the CPSU CC to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti on the Soviet leadership's position on the situation in Hungary.

November 4, 1956

Zhukov report on the situation in Hungary as of 12 noon

Zhukov reports on the progress made by Soviet troops entering Hungary. He writes that troops have recaptured key institutions and buildings in Budapest and the provinces. Zhukov notes that the government of Imre Nagy has gone into hiding and that to prevent the escape of insurgents and leaders the Soviet army has occupied the airports and closed off roads along the border with Austria. The report describes remaining areas of resistance such as the Corwin Theater in Budapest.

July 1, 1953

Letter from Beria to Malenkov, 1 July 1953

Letter from Beria to Malenkov, 1 July 1953, taking blame for his inappropriate actions.

November 4, 1956

Stenographic record of a 4 November 1956 meeting of Party activists

Khrushchev describes the events of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the crisis in Poland. He recounts the CPSU's consultations with other communist parties in the socialist camp to determine their attitude toward Soviet intervention, particularly in Hungary. Leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet position, but Polish leaders opposed the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Khrushchev reports that following these meetings, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to prepare for an attack on the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. He then reads aloud an open letter which declares the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government. He gives details about the suppression of the counterrevolution by Soviet armed forces and the positive reaction of the socialist countries. He states that the lessons of the counterrevolution are to improve relations with the fraternal parties and the socialist countries and to treat them with respect; to improve political work among students and the masses so that they are not mislead by counterrevolutionaries; and to strengthen the Soviet Army.

November 3, 1956

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Munnich, and I. Horvath

Kadar argues that the source of mistakes in the past resulted from the monopoly that a handful of Hungarians had on relations with the Soviet Union. Rakosi is singled out as a source for previous difficulties. Kadar believes that forming a new revolutionary government is the only way to undermine the violence of the counterrevolution and prevent Nagy from acting as cover for such activities. To garner support amongst workers, Kadar argues that the new government must not be a Soviet puppet.

Pagination