Chen asks Khrushchev to go over the pressing international issues and he presents the USSR's stances on the situation in Laos, South Korea, and Cuba. Khrushchev also raises problems in GDR and difficulties in negotiations with Western powers with regards to the German question. Khrushchev also mentions Soviet plans to launch a spaceship and resume nuclear testing. The two leaders also discuss the challenges of agricultural development.

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Mario Monje, informs Chestnoy about a recent meeting with Che Guevara, in which they discuss the differences in Chinese Communist leadership policies. Guevara states that if forced to choose between the two sides, Cuban leadership would be on the side of the Soviet Union.

Siurus specifies how representatives of the Chinese embassy in Havana are spreading negative propaganda and the Soviet Union in Cuba. Trade negotiations with Poland and Cuban sugar exports to Britain are also discussed.

Guevara informs the Soviets that he has been falsely accused of being "pro-Chinese." They discuss certain differences between Guevara and Soviet officials in terms of approach to the Liberation Movement in Latin America. Guevara reports recent economic progress and economic development plans in Cuba.

Instructions to Soviet ambassadors on dealing with China's outreach to socialist countries in the eastern bloc, outlining a series of steps for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would
foster skepticism about China’s intentions and thwart efforts by Chinese representatives to make wide-ranging contacts in these states. The directive notes China’s hostility to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia and contrasts this with its development of extensive relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and North Korea.

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

[Excerpt] Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting regarding telegrams from Cuba regarding the attitudes of SWAPO men and Angolans towards the Cubans and fighting. The Politburo members also discussed Sino-Soviet relations, Cuban sugar sales, and Soviet cooperation with Spain.