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Documents

January 20, 1951

Report from P. F. Yudin to I. V. Stalin on Meetings with the Leaders of the Communist Party of China, including Mao Zedong on 31 December 1950

Yudin recounts his meetings with Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. In three meetings, Yudin learned more about China's relations with other communist parties in Asia, economic conditions in China, and developments in the Korean War.

October 1, 1950

Telegram from Vyshinsky

Kiselev's mistakes during the discussion of Korean issue is reported.

October 26, 1949

Draft Reply to Mao Zedong's Telegram from Stalin via Molotov

Stalin agrees with Mao Zedong that North Korea is not yet ready to launch an assault, and reports that the Soviet Union has told North Korea to concentrate on developing liberated areas and guerrillas in South Korea.

August 9, 1966

On the Korean War, 1950-1952, and the Armistice Negotiations

A survey of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Korean War compiled in 1966 by an unidentified members of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive. The apparent
purpose of this internal history was to provide background information for the small group of Soviet officials who were at that time engaged in discussions with the People’s Republic of China and North Vietnam over possible Soviet assistance to the Viet Cong in their war with the United States.

December 27, 1952

Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong

Stalin agrees to send ammunitions to Mao in preparation for a US attack.

December 7, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Roshchin Transmitting Message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

Message from Stalin to Zhou Enlai agreeing with Chinese conditions for a ceasefire and advising that the Chinese limit negotiations on a ceasefire until Seoul is liberated.

January 19, 1950

Telegram Shtykov to Vyshinsky on a Luncheon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK

Shtykov reports a meeting with Kim Il Sung, along with Chinese and Korean delegates. Kim Il Sung expresses his view on the prospect of a liberation of the South Korean people that is to follow the Chinese success in liberation. Kim expresses his view that the South Koreans support his cause for reunification which the South Korean government does not seem to purse, and that he desires to ask Stalin for permission on an offensive action on South Korea.