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Documents

May 1968

Memo to V. V. Kuznetsov Regarding Proposed Clarifications to the NPT

This memo to Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, includes proposed amendments and clarifications to various articles and sections of the NPT. Topics of the proposed amendments include an emphasis on the continued importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the exchange of research and technology on peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The document also describes how to proceed in negotiations with the American side, as well as with several Warsaw Pact countries, and to telegraph once the requests in the memo have been delivered.

October 29, 1971

Report by KGB Chairman Andropov on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

A report from KGB Chairman Andropov to the Central Committee of the CPSU assessing the status of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe in their “transition” period and measures that might be taken to weaken them. It alleges that RFE and RL are planning subversive actions against the USSR at the Munich Olympics. It credits the Soviet bloc intelligence services with increasing the problems of the Radios. The document indicates timely KGB knowledge of internal RL documents such as the March 15, 1971 revision of the Radio Liberty Policy Manual.

June 2007

Counter-Intelligence Protection, 1971. Folder 97. The Chekist Anthology.

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.