Andrei Gromyko describes the diplomatic measures he deems necessary to ensure the adherence of influential nations and countries in the Socialist sphere to the NPT. Valuing negotiation and diplomatic conversations between representatives, Gromyko especially seeks to obtain the support of countries who have previously expressed reservations about the treaty.

Talking points for Soviet ambassadors to Socialist states to use in conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ambassadors are told to relay the message that adherence to the NPT is beneficial for all Socialist nations and their allies.

Gorbachev and Kohl discuss relations with the United States, Kohl's upcoming visit to Poland, and the status of reforms in various socialist countries.

Stalin and the Hungarian delegation discuss economic issues, and the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia.

Soviet Ambassador Zorin and Czech official Firlinger go over the details of the draft armistice agreement with Hungary.

Khrushchev and members of the CPSU CC Presidium decide to not withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. Negotiations with Tito and the situation in Yugoslavia are also mentioned.

Liu Shaoqi discusses the potential withdrawal of Soviet advisors from China. Although the Chinese government was considering sending back some specialist, they did not want the abrupt removal of all specialists as happened in Yugoslavia. Liu Shaoqi also brings up the 1956 uprisings in Hungary and Poland, saying that such events were a “useful lesson for the entire communist movement.”

The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.

This resolution instructs the Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade to transmit a letter to Tito requesting a secret meeting on November 1 or 2 with Khrushchev and Malenkov. It also empowers certain members to conduct negotiations with the United Workers Party of Poland.

In this coded telegram, the Soviet Ministry is informed of Imre Nagy’s location at the Yugolsav embassy in Budapest. Firiubin reports that the Yugoslavs are attempting to obtain a statement from Nagy in support of Kadar’s new government. Tito is noted as requesting that the Soviet government not repress communists who ‘did not immediately take the correct line’ during the uprising and that the Soviet government protect the Yugoslav embassy from potential attack.