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Documents

November 28, 1989

Decision About the Measures Regarding the Decision of the KGB Collegium of the USSR of 5 September 1989, 'About the Tasks of the State Security Services of the USSR Regarding the Defense of the Soviet Constitutional Regime'

In response to the increase of anti-Soviet and Romanian nationalist propaganda, the Moldavian KGB decides to form a new organization, Section 3, "to provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime." Detailed instructions are given for the new Sections operations and activities.

July 3, 1972

Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, no. 210 s, to CPSU Central Committee, 'Proposal Regarding the Organization of KGB Organs in the Frontier Counties of the Republic'

Request from the Moldavian Communist Party to send KGB officers to Moldavia in light of the “intensification of subversive activities directed against the republic by the special services and ideological centers of the Western countries,” of Israel, and of Romania. Travelers coming from Romania were deemed particularly dangerous because of their efforts “to inculcate our citizens with a nationalist spirit.” A “considerable part of them” smuggled in “materials and literature that are dangerous from the political perspective” while others “propagated the separate course of the Romanian leadership, the idea of breaking off the former Bessarabia from the USSR and uniting it with Romania.”

June 2007

Counter-Intelligence Protection, 1971. Folder 97. The Chekist Anthology.

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.