Draft attached to telegram, explaining that the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Relations (MFA) and Ministry of Foreign Trade (MVT) disagree with the idea of suspending negotiations with Iranians. Specifically, this is because they believe the recess will be used against them by the British and Americans in Iran.

Gorbachev and Thatcher discuss the potential response through the UN to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

The conversation is concerning the "German question" in terms of the conditions and aftermath of the surrender. PR China sees the negotiation on Germany as becoming an agreement that might apply similar to the question on the Japanese surrender. For this reason Jing Tai asks Molotov to allow China to take part in the negotiations on Germany. The trials of Japanese war criminals were also discussed.

Notes taken by Minister of Foreign Trade Anastas Mikoyan during a meeting with Mao Zedong in Beijing. They discuss relations with the United States and other Western powers and the nationalization of foreign-owned factories in China. Mikoyan also gave advice on developing the new Communist government in China. Noteably, Mikoyan wrote that "the path of the regime of the people’s democracies, or the path of the Russian Soviet revolution, is not quite appropriate for China. China has its own path of development."

At a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, US, Britain and France, the USSR proposes a conference including the PRC, but the others oppose China's participation.

A discussion in Sofia, Bulgaria between Stoicho Moshanov and D.G. Yakovlev. The two issues discussed were the internal political situation in Bulgaria and British policy in Bulgaria

In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.

Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.

Outlines the KGB’s response to the USSR’s signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The accords obligated signatories to respect their citizens’ human rights. This gave Soviet dissidents and westerners leverage in demanding that the USSR end persecution on the basis of religious or political beliefs.

Some of the KGB’s active measures included the establishment of a charitable fund dedicated to helping victims of imperialism and capitalism, and the fabrication of a letter from a Ukrainian group to FRG President Walter Scheel describing human rights violations in West Germany. The document also mentions that the Soviet Ministry of Defense obtained an outline of the various European powers’ positions on human rights issues as presented at the March 1977 meeting of the European Economic Community in London from the Italian Foreign Ministry.

The KGB also initiated Operation “Raskol” [“Schism”], which ran between 1977 and 1980. This operation included active measures to discredit Soviet dissidents Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, measures designed to drive a wedge between the US and its democratic allies, and measures intended to convince the US government that continued support for the dissident movement did nothing to harm the position of the USSR.

Mao Zedong informs Roshchin that India and Burma had expressed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with China, and that the UK may follow suit. The Chinese position, Mao said, is to agree to negotiations if these governments renounced their ties with the Guomindang. Mao and Roshchin also discussed the military situation and the question of Japanese POWs. Mao did not the POWs right away because the Chinese legal system was not developed enough. He also informed Roshchin of his intention to curtain stay in the USSR.