Yudin recounts his meetings with Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. In three meetings, Yudin learned more about China's relations with other communist parties in Asia, economic conditions in China, and developments in the Korean War.

Petro Gedeshi and Kurt Schneidewind argue about the Soviet decision to recall specialists from the China. Kim Il Sung understands the delay of Khrushchev's visit to the DPRK and suggests that it be rescheduled for spring 1961.

Soviet record of conversation between delegations from the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and China. They argue over China's policy toward India and toward Taiwan, and assert that China is pursuing a path that will hurt its Communist allies and risk war. Also notes the extent of Mao's personality cult in China.

A purported speech by Stalin to a special session of the Politburo. He argues that because of differing ideologies between the USSR and the United States, hostilities are inevitable and, for that reason, the country's military should be enlarged. He praises the example set by the Chinese communist movement, and notes that India should be where the Soviet Union directs its attention to next.

Brian Murray questions the validity of the document in CWIHP Working Paper No. 12, where the document was first published.

Instructions to Soviet ambassadors discussing the growing military cooperation between China and the United States.

On 3 May Roshchin was at a reception of the Indian ambassador Panikkar. At the reception many different representatives were present. During the reception Panikkar expressed his great frustration over his difficult situation regarding the export of grain from China, and informed that in the current situation in India there is no way to produce the quantity of grain that they could receive from China. There was given special attention to the Czechoslovak representatives and trade delegation.

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Prime Minister J. Nehru. In the excerpt presented here, Nehru expressed a positive evaluation of Soviet-Indian relations, complimenting Khrushchev for his role in resolving the Cuban crisis, but in response to the Soviet envoy's emphasis that the border crisis with China be settled peacefully he firmly defended India's stand that PRC forces must withdraw from recently-occupied positions (e.g., return to the line held on September 8) before talks could start.

Mao Zedong informs Roshchin that India and Burma had expressed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with China, and that the UK may follow suit. The Chinese position, Mao said, is to agree to negotiations if these governments renounced their ties with the Guomindang. Mao and Roshchin also discussed the military situation and the question of Japanese POWs. Mao did not the POWs right away because the Chinese legal system was not developed enough. He also informed Roshchin of his intention to curtain stay in the USSR.

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, and Vietnamese Vice-Premier Pham Van Dong discuss various topics relevant to the Geneva Convention, including the construction of foreign military bases in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam, the establishment of regrouping zones in northeast Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochina, and the possible formation of an international supervisory commission.

A conversation held between Soviet Ambassador to China Pavel Yudin and Mao Zedong. The discussion primarily concerned the activity of the peasantry in China joining collective farms, the development of the agricultural sector of the economy, and Chinese food aid to India and Burma.