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Mitrokhin Archive

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January 30, 1949	Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong Mao discusses the military situation in China, which he states is heavily in the favor of the CCP. Mao discusses the plans for finishing off the Guomindang forces, which are to be delayed a couple months. Mao discusses China's standing compared to Russia's. Mao discusses his own standing among the Soviet leaders.
January 31, 1949	Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong Mao discusses the formation of a coalition government and when best to form the government. Mao discusses his strategies against Bai Chongxi and the strength of the CCP forces. Mao also discusses the representative office of the VKP(b) CC with the CCP CC, running the military districts, Guomindang naval forces, the conditions of workers, the cadres, professional unions, working youth and women, talks with the Guomindang government, foreign trade, and the foreign policy of the CCP.
August 24, 1981	Soviet position on the Declaration of the Afghan Government This statement demonstrates the DRA's focus to participate in international affairs. The DRA commits itself to the policy of non-alignment, while discussing possible settlements of the situation in Afghanistan which involve the United Nations.
October 31, 1962	Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev (2) Gromyko telling Alekseev to relay instructions to Castro, namely for Castro to take strides in normalizing relations with the US and other Latin American countries.
September 27, 1950	Telegram from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) and T.F. Shtykov Stalin blames the recent success of the UN forces in Seoul on the inefficiency of the KPA’s Frontline Command and Soviet military advisors, as well erroneous use of tank tactics and overall combat strategy. Stalin provides a detailed list instructing military advisors, and especially Vasilyev, how to delpoy and manage Korean troops around Seoul.
January 6, 1949	Ciphered Telegram No. 0100, Stalin to Terebin Stalin, through Terebin (Andrei Orlov), acknowledges that creating a democratic coalition government in China will take a significant amount of time. Stalin states, however, that it would be best if the final stages of the process take place sooner than the summer, the time Mao planned to have the government established.
January 10, 1949	Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov] Mao, via Terebin, tells Stalin, via Kuznetsov, of his, Mao's, plans for the next few months. He will continue his meeting with the Central Committee for a few more days; afterward he will go to Moscow and will stay for a month, to discuss the various questions he has mapped out. Upon returning to China, Mao will attempt to finish off the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD). Mao discusses how to do so. Terebin relays further conversations with Mao concerning whether or not Fu Zuoyi should be tried as a war criminal and the state of the war against the GMD.
January 10, 1949	Cable, Mao to Filippov [Stalin] Mao responds to Stalin's telegram from 6 January 1949. Mao states that any government the GMD may create will be of no influence, that the GMD army is diminished, and that soon the People's Liberation Army will be able to march south and capture several important provinces.
June 2007	National Alliance of Russian Solidarists. Folder 53. The Chekist Anthology In this entry Vasili Mitrokhin expresses the KGB concerns regarding the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists’ (NTS) anti-socialist activities held in the Soviet Union and in the West. Mitrokhin states that the KGB had the task of taking control of NTS’ activities as well as destroing their reputation and connections with other anti-Soviet organizations. In order to paralyze the NTS, the KGB’s fundamental goal was to establish strong connections with the organization by sending undercover agents. Toward the end of 1963, the NTS became familiar with the presence of KGB agents among their members. KGB’s main goal was to create an illusion that the NTS was ruled by the KGB, which would help to make America and the West to distrust the organization. According to Mitrokhin, taking over the NTS’s publication “The Posev” was important as well. Mitrokhin provides a KGB plan to overturn the publication and he also attaches the list of all KGB agents who were involved in this undertaking, including their short biographies and codenames.
June 2007	The Operational Situation as Reported in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Folder 35. The Chekist Anthology. In folder 35 Mitrokhin discusses the KGB’s assertion of an increase in domestic dissent and unrest in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as the methods the KGB utilized to combat this threat. Soviet intelligence believed that this increase in domestic unrest was due primarily to an increased effort by the United States and its allies to promote internal instability within the USSR. In response, the KGB continued to screen foreigners, increased the harshness of penalties for distribution of anti-Soviet literature, and monitored the activities and temperament of nationalists, immigrants, church officials, and authors of unsigned literature within the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin’s note recounts the KGB’s assertion that foreign intelligence agencies were expanding their attempts to create domestic unrest within the USSR. These activities included the support and creation of dissidents within the Soviet Union, the facilitation of the theft Soviet property such as aircrafts, and the public espousal of a position against Soviet persecution of dissidents and Jews. Responding to public exposure of these activities, the KGB proclaimed its legality and trustworthiness while also beginning to assign some agents verbal assignments without written record.