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October 22, 1986

Meeting Minutes of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, Regarding the Aftermath of the Reykjavik US-Soviet summit

The Politburo discusses what to do after the failure of the Reykjavik summit over Reagan's insistence on preserving the right to continue the SDI or "Star Wars" project, as well as the subsequent expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the US. In the angry, bitter meeting Gorbachev decides on the removal of 250 Soviets working in service positions at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

September 25, 1986

Meeting Minutes of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, Regarding Persecution of Political Dissidents and Spies

In this September 1986 excerpt, Gorbachev receives a report from KGB chief Chebrikov that he had requested on “what kinds of people are serving sentences for crimes, which Western propaganda calls political.” Obviously following Gorbachev’s lead, Chebrikov proposes to alleviate the prison sentences of two-thirds of the 240 persons he lists under this category; but, in response to a question from Gromyko, he notes two cases where the guilty parties had already received a sentence that could not be reduced—execution for espionage.

April 19, 1971

Memorandum from Andropov to Ustinov, Regarding US Positions in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Negotiations

KGB chief Andropov analyzes the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty negotiations, particularly the US negotiating positions and the preferences of various Washington agencies.

August 3, 1960

Note from USSR Embassy to the USA Relayed by Gromyko to Khrushchev, 'John Fitzgerald Kennedy - Political Character Sketch'

Andrei Gromyko forwards to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy.

June 7, 1960

Note from KGB Chairman A. Shelepin to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Regarding Plan to Discredit CIA Chief Dulles

Shelepin sets out a plan to discredit CIA chief Allen Dulles.

November 25, 1991

Memo, US Proposals Concerning Limited Non-Nuclear Space Defense and Missile Attack Warning System

Memo on Soviet-American consultations in Washington between November 25 and 27, 1991. The American side proposed discussion of limited non-nuclear missile defense and early warning systems, but the Soviet side refused to be drawn into lengthy discussions. The US also rejected the Soviet proposal to create joint missile attack warning systems.

1988

Memo, Concerning Draft Agreement About the Observance of the ABM Treaty and Non-Withdrawal Period

Memo describing Geneva negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The two sides disagreed on the restrictions of the non-withdrawal period and the testing of ABM components or sensors in space.

July 12, 1969

Memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger

In this July 1969 report to the Politburo, Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin recounts a wide-ranging conversation with national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger a half-year into President Richard M. Nixon’s first term. Dobrynin also offers his candid personal evaluation of Kissinger and the secret White House “backchannel” established by Nixon to circumvent the State Department and communicate directly with the Soviet leadership.

October 24, 1962

Soviet Report on the Situation in the US Following Kennedy's Announcement

Report on the situation in the US following Kennedy's announcement, including how the crisis is being presented in news media, increased security measures, the mood in New York City and protests occurring in response.

October 18, 1962

From the cable on the conversation between Gromyko and Kennedy

Gromyko reported on his meeting with Kennedy. The Soviet representative argued that Cuba was never a threat to the US and Washington should end its hostile activities against Havana. He also warned Kennedy of the possibility of nuclear war in the event of an invasion of Cuba. Gromyko reiterated the Moscow's intention of supporting Cuba only in economic and defensive issues. Kennedy, however, pointed out that it was difficult to explain the surge in Soviet military aid to Cuba. The US president reaffirmed that Washington did not have any plan to invade Cuba, at least after Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose. The US was only preventing actions that could have led to war. Gromyko reemphasized the peaceful rivalry of the two ideological systems and proposed a meeting between the two leaders.

Pagination