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June 18, 1953

Secret Telephone Report by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovski in Berlin to V. M. Molotov, 18 June 1953, Morning

On June 18th the Soviets began actively to include German organizations and SED party organizations to restore order in Berlin. At 9:30 a.m. at the Brandenburg gates, employees of the people's police of the GDR were fired upon from the direction of West Berlin. The people's police fired several shots in return, as a result of which one West Berlin policeman was killed.

July 5, 1954

From the Journal of V. V. Vaskov, 27 August 1954: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong on 5 July 1954

Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Beijing V.V. Vaskov and Comrade Mao Zedong discuss the Soviet plans to take advantage of the changing situation in France. Mao mentions that Zhou is meeting with Ho Chi Ming and Vo Nguyen Giap in Guanxi and won't be able to come to Geneva until July 12-13. The topic of conversation then shifts to the US and a recent meeting between US President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Mao notes that there is a diverge between Eisenhower and Churchill regarding the desirability of a dialogue with the Communists. Mao says that the US has dispersed its forces far and wide, so they are trying to resurrect West Germany and Japan.

June 2, 1953

Speech by Georgii M. Malenkov to a visiting government delegation from the German Democratic Republic (GDR)

Malenkov discusses East and West Germany, arguing that failure to unify the two countries will lead to another world war. He argues that the "forced" building of socialism in East Germany is in fact an obstacle to reunification, proposing that a reunification will be possible "only on the basis that Germany will be a bourgeois-democratic republic."

June 2007

Solzhenitsyn, Codenamed Pauk [Spider]. Folder 40. The Chekist Anthology.

This folder contains information about KGB active measures directed at author Alexander Solzhenitsyn following his exile from the Soviet Union in 1974. The operational directives prepared by the KGB’s leadership for 1974 and 1975 are reproduced verbatim. They included plans to limit Solzhenitsyn’s influence in the West, discredit him and the pro-democracy literary journal “Continent” with which he was closely associated, and make his family fear for their personal safety.

Many of the specific measures undertaken by the KGB are described in the document. These included televised interviews with men featured in “The Gulag Archipelago” in which they claimed that Solzhenitsyn fabricated or misrepresented their statements to him, the publication of personal letters between Solzhenitsyn and his close male friends which were intended to reveal the “intimacy of their relations,” and the publication of an article claiming that Solzhenitsyn failed to pay his taxes while he resided in Switzerland. The 1978 operation codenamed “Vampire 1” involved planting a news story which suggested that Solzhenitsyn was a KGB spy, and having it reprinted in prominent newspapers and journals throughout Europe and the US. The document concludes with an index of acronyms, people, and codenames mentioned in the folder.

June 2, 1988

Military Exercise Shchit-88 Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period 0800 2 June to 1900 6 June 1988

This document provides background information on a hypothetical political/military scenario leading up to the command staff exercise SHICHT-88 [TARCZA-88 in Polish]. In the scenario 'Blue' military leaders have begun to oppose the policy of detente pursued by their governments and consequently have raised their level of combat readiness by increasing the frequency of military exercises and pressured 'Blue' governments into ending the destruction of intermediate-range nuclear forces as required by the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe. In response the 'Reds' have also raised their combat readiness. The increased international tension has affected the situation within Poland, contributing to increased anti-government sentiment.

December 11, 1961

Comments of N. S. Khrushchev, 11 December 1961

Krushchev dictates his ideas for a general memorandum that he will give to Kroll. The memorandum will describe the situation in Germany and the possible development of Soviet-West German relations. It should demonstrate to West Germany the economic and political advantages of improving its relationship with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev describes the potential for West Germany's allies to capitalize on Cold War tensions in Germany and concludes that better relations with the Soviet Union will make West Germany a more active force in East-West relations and lead to a more stable balance of power.

August 28, 1962

Conversation of Cde. N. S. Khrushchev and acting United Nations Secretary General U Thant, 28 August 1962

Khrushchev and Thant discuss the possibility of a visit by Khrushchev to the UN General Assembly. Khrushchev says a visit is not likely until the Americans, French, British and Germans are ready to negotiate a solution to the Berlin question. Khrushchev outlines the Soviet position and says that the Soviet Union will sign a unilateral peace treaty with the GDR if their conditions are not met. He says that the SU would agree to UN intervention and to a multilateral peace treaty, which would avert international conflict and war. Khrushchev suggests that the UN headquarters be transferred to West Germany due to high costs and discrimination in New York. He identifies additional issues for discussion: the admittance of the People's Republic of China into the UN, the Taiwan-China issue, and disarmament. Thant and Khrushchev discuss the obstacles to resolution of the German question, including public opinion in America. They also discuss American dominance in the UN Secretariat, free trade, and the Common Market, among other topics.

March 1975

Task for the Operational Command Staff Exercise Soyuz-75 for the 4th Army

This document outlines the politico-military situation in advance of a 17-25 March 1975 operational command staff exercise. The exercise scenario begins with a conventional offensive initiated by the 'Westerners' at 0600 on 17 March which escalated to a theater nuclear war by 19 March. This briefing document for exercise participants describes the military situation as of the morning of 19 March, including the tactical information on the geographic disposition, activities, and status of Warsaw Pact and 'Western' forces, air defense, communications, electronic warfare, and the situation in the rear. Appendices (included as a .pdf) contain detailed information on: The order of battle of the troops of the 4th Army, The availability of nuclear warheads and surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] in the 4th Army, Information about the nuclear strikes of the "Westerners," Information about the nuclear strikes by the "Easterners" on troops and objectives in the "Westerners" rear, Information about the engineer troops of the 4th Army, Information about the chemical troops of the 4th Army, Information about the signal troops of the 4th Army, Information about the rear of the 4th Army, The order of battle and the identified numbering of the formations and units of the "Westerners."

June 2007

Association of the United Postwar Immigrants. Folder 52. The Chekist Anthology.

In this entry Mitrokhin provides an example of methods the KGB used to make foreign intelligence services distrust Soviet anti-socialist organizations. Mitrokhin cites the case of the Association of the United Soviet Postwar Immigrants. According to Mitrokhin, the head of the organization was a former citizen of the Soviet Union, but after WWII he stayed in Western Germany and had been actively promoting anti-socialist ideology among immigrants. Mitrokhin does not provide his real name, but uses his KGB codename “Konstantinov.”

According to Mitrokhin, in February of 1963 the KGB sent counterfeit documents to West German counter-intelligence stating that “Konstantinov” had been an active KGB spy since WWII. The KGB also sent letters in the name of Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants to National Alliance of Russian Solidarists stating that the officials of the latter organization are “politically bankrupt” and that they were no longer able to promote anti-socialist ideology. The KGB residency in Belgium prepared a flyer with false information stating that the Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants was a corrupt institution whose president used its funds for personal use. According to Mitrokhin, the reputation of the Association of United Soviet Postwar Immigrants was destroyed and no longer remained influential.

June 2007

The Conrad Case. Folder 72. The Chekist Anthology

In this folder Mitrokhin describes the work experience of German KGB agent Conrad (codename “Gregor”), his experience as a spy, involvement with communist parties in different countries, and activities as the head of military sabotage groups in Western Europe.

Pagination