1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
East Asia
1879- 1953
1893- 1976
1912- 1994
1907- 1964
1898- 1976
1909- 1989
North America
North Korea
September 8, 1951
Mao asks for more Soviet advisers for Chinese troops in Korea.
November 14, 1951
Mao writes to Stalin of the ongoing armistice negotiations concerning Korea, specifically the proposed demarcation line (38th parallel). Mao also writes about monitoring, the exchange of prisoners of war, and economic considerations within China.
December 25, 1951
Gromyko suggests to Stalin, via Razuvaev, to turn down Vyshinsky’s proposal for publishing a communiqué about the American position in the armistice talks.
January 31, 1952
Mao asks Stalin advice and instructions concerning issues raised during negotiations, particularly the establishment of a monitoring organ comprised of officials from neutral countries.
February 8, 1952
Mao conveys two telegrams to Stalin: one from Peng Dehuai to Mao (22 January 1952) and the other is Mao’s response (4 February 1952). The telegrams discuss North Korea’s need for aid from China.
March 5, 1952
Message from Gromyko (MID) to Stalin advising against the proposal of Amb. Razuvaev to publish an interview of Kim Il Sung on the grounds that it is inflammatory and rash.
April 16, 1952
Telegram from Kim Il Sung to Stalin confirming that he would accept Stalin's offer to send 50,000 tons of bread.
September 16, 1952
Mao, via Zhou Enlai, informs Stalin of the position China means to take the discussion of the Korean question at the UN. Mao also asks Stalin’s advise about whether or not to sign non-aggression pacts with India and Burma.
October 8, 1950
Stalin sends Kim a copy of his October 1950 letter to Mao Zedong. Stalin describes the US inability to engage in a "big war" and encourages Kim in his fight against the US.
September 30, 1950
A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.
