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January 10, 1949	Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov] Mao, via Terebin, tells Stalin, via Kuznetsov, of his, Mao's, plans for the next few months. He will continue his meeting with the Central Committee for a few more days; afterward he will go to Moscow and will stay for a month, to discuss the various questions he has mapped out. Upon returning to China, Mao will attempt to finish off the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD). Mao discusses how to do so. Terebin relays further conversations with Mao concerning whether or not Fu Zuoyi should be tried as a war criminal and the state of the war against the GMD.
January 10, 1949	Cable, Mao to Filippov [Stalin] Mao responds to Stalin's telegram from 6 January 1949. Mao states that any government the GMD may create will be of no influence, that the GMD army is diminished, and that soon the People's Liberation Army will be able to march south and capture several important provinces.
June 2007	National Alliance of Russian Solidarists. Folder 53. The Chekist Anthology In this entry Vasili Mitrokhin expresses the KGB concerns regarding the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists’ (NTS) anti-socialist activities held in the Soviet Union and in the West. Mitrokhin states that the KGB had the task of taking control of NTS’ activities as well as destroing their reputation and connections with other anti-Soviet organizations. In order to paralyze the NTS, the KGB’s fundamental goal was to establish strong connections with the organization by sending undercover agents. Toward the end of 1963, the NTS became familiar with the presence of KGB agents among their members. KGB’s main goal was to create an illusion that the NTS was ruled by the KGB, which would help to make America and the West to distrust the organization. According to Mitrokhin, taking over the NTS’s publication “The Posev” was important as well. Mitrokhin provides a KGB plan to overturn the publication and he also attaches the list of all KGB agents who were involved in this undertaking, including their short biographies and codenames.
June 2007	The Operational Situation as Reported in 1971, 1975, and 1981. Folder 35. The Chekist Anthology. In folder 35 Mitrokhin discusses the KGB’s assertion of an increase in domestic dissent and unrest in the 1970s and early 1980s as well as the methods the KGB utilized to combat this threat. Soviet intelligence believed that this increase in domestic unrest was due primarily to an increased effort by the United States and its allies to promote internal instability within the USSR. In response, the KGB continued to screen foreigners, increased the harshness of penalties for distribution of anti-Soviet literature, and monitored the activities and temperament of nationalists, immigrants, church officials, and authors of unsigned literature within the Soviet Union. Mitrokhin’s note recounts the KGB’s assertion that foreign intelligence agencies were expanding their attempts to create domestic unrest within the USSR. These activities included the support and creation of dissidents within the Soviet Union, the facilitation of the theft Soviet property such as aircrafts, and the public espousal of a position against Soviet persecution of dissidents and Jews. Responding to public exposure of these activities, the KGB proclaimed its legality and trustworthiness while also beginning to assign some agents verbal assignments without written record.
2009	Vassiliev White Notebook #2 Original notes kept by Alexander Vassiliev while researching in the KGB archives. Contains scans of the original notebook, a Russian transcription, and an English translation.
2009	Vassiliev White Notebook #3 Original notes kept by Alexander Vassiliev while researching in the KGB archives. Contains scans of the original notebook, a Russian transcription, and an English translation.
2009	Vassiliev Odd Pages Original notes kept by Alexander Vassiliev while researching in the KGB archives. Vassiliev's loose "odd" pages which were not part of a notebook. Contains scans of the original pages, a Russian transcription, and an English translation.
December 30, 1948	Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin Mao details to Stalin the recent military operations the Communists have undertaken against the Guomindang army. The first is in the area of Suizhou, Huaiying, and the Huaihe River. The second is in Du Yuming. Mao states that once these operations are complete, he will depart for Moscow. Mao discusses future tactics against the Guomindang.
June 2007	About the Middle East. Folder 81. The Chekist Anthology Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo. Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit. To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.
September 14, 1962	M. Zakharov and S. P. Ivanov to N.S. Khrushchev Zakharov and Ivanov report to Khrushchev the extent of US surveillance in Cuba and request extra fortifications for Soviet ships in Cuban waters.