Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

Russian Soviet Union Clear All

Related Resources

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Sino-Soviet Relations

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Photograph of 38th parallel crossing during Korean War

Korean War, 1950-1953

Photograph of Azadi Tower

Middle East

Iran

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich

1890- 1986

Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1959

Soviet Nuclear History

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1950

Iran-Soviet Relations

Anastas Mikoyan in 1959

Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich

1895- 1978

Results:

1721 - 1730 of 1821

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

2009	Vassiliev Yellow Notebook #4 Original notes kept by Alexander Vassiliev while researching in the KGB archives. Contains scans of the original notebook, a Russian transcription, and an English translation.
2009	Vassiliev Black Notebook Original notes kept by Alexander Vassiliev while researching in the KGB archives. Contains scans of the original notebook, a Russian transcription, and an English translation.
October 8, 1950	Letter from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtytkov) Stalin sends Kim a copy of his October 1950 letter to Mao Zedong. Stalin describes the US inability to engage in a "big war" and encourages Kim in his fight against the US.
May 29, 1980	Protocol #213/39, 29 May 1980 This protocol gives the specifics of Soviet cooperation with the Sandinistas, especially in terms of propaganda (films, photography, Marxist-Leninist literature, etc.).
June 4, 1981	Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting (excerpt), 4 June 1981 The Politburo discusses the internal economic situation within the Soviet Union, the situation in Afghanistan (in particular the group "Parcham" and Karmal), relations with the US, and the treatment of Jews in the USSR.
August 2, 1980	CPSU CC Report, 02 August 1980 This report deals with Operation "Arsenal." More specifically, it discusses the operation's discovery and seizure of weapons and explosive materials illegally kept by the population.
March 5, 1953	CPSU CC Protocol, 'Record of Proceedings of the Joint Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the Council of Ministers of the Union of the SSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR' This protocol concerns the meeting of the CPSU Presidium & Soviet Council of Ministers as Stalin was about to die.
June 2007	Disarming 'Osot' ideologically, 1963-73. Folder 12. The Chekist Anthology. Vasiliy Mitrokhin provides a detailed account of the KGB active measures in the case of Vladimir Dremluga, codenamed “Osot.” In 1963, at the age of 23, Dremluga was put on probation for his repeated attempts to leave the country. In 1964, Dremluga enrolled in the Leningrad University where he met Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, the leading members of the samizdat journal Chronicle of Current Affairs. A year later, Dremluga was dismissed from the University for indecent behavior. In 1968, he was sentenced to three years in jail for acting inimically to the country. While in prison, Dremluga did not disavow his anti-Soviet beliefs. Upon his release in 1971 he was sentenced again. During his second imprisonment in Yakutia, the KGB decided to proceed with active measures against Dremluga. Dremluga's second prison term had no impact on his overt anti-Soviet statements. However, he became reclusive, exercising more caution and deliberation in making new acquaintances. The next step for the KGB was to introduce him to agent “Mayskiy” (May). Agent Mayskiy reported that Dremluga's lengthy imprisonment had restricted his communication with friends in Moscow who shared his beliefs. He actively sought ways to reconnect with them. The KGB's plan was to initiate a “postal chain” for Dremluga to supposedly reestablish his channels of communication. Agent Mayskiy offered Dremluga to correspond with his peers in Moscow through Svetlana, Mayskiy's friend in Yakutsk who had an acquaintance in Moscow. Svetlana was to be reached through “Maslova,” allegedly a teacher at the prisoner's night school. In fact, all correspondence went directly to the KGB. By means of such “postal chain,” the KGB was able to work out Yakir and Krasin and, consequently, press criminal charges against them. In his written conversations, Dremluga continued to express anti-Soviet opinions. But his convictions were soon undermined by the Yakir and Krasin's trial and letters he received from the operatives in Moscow, depicting a tragic defeat of the democratic movement. Dremluga became uncertain and wavering. Having isolated Dremluga from his like-minded friends, the KGB then insisted that he repent and publicly condemn his own anti-Soviet actions. For fear of reprisal, Dremluga eventually renounced his views and condemned his activity.
June 2007	Pseudonym. Folder 11. The Chekist Anthology. Mitrokhin states that discipline was the main reason for assigning a pseudonym to a KGB agent. Some agents refused to choose a pseudonym, considering it to be humiliating. But as Mitrokhin points out, a refusal to use a pseudonym could diminish the psychological and operational effect of the recruitment process. The KGB Order No. 00430 stipulated that all recruits had to sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding their collaboration with the agency. The KGB Order No. 00235 specified that the most valuable agents had to be indexed solely by their respective pseudonyms. As a recruitment tactic, Mitrokhin notes, the use of a pseudonym enhanced agent’s awareness of the secretive nature of one’s work and accentuated the conspiratorial function of the KGB.
June 2007	Directorate K Memorandum No. 153/838, 21 January 1976. Folder 13. The Chekist Anthology The Memorandum No. 153/838 considered problems associated with the dissident movement of the Peoples Workers’ Union (Narodno-trudovoy soyuz, NTS). Vasili Mitrokhin writes that among the primary concerns mentioned in the Memorandum was the execution of complex active measures to aggravate contradictions between the leadership of various NTS groups. The Memorandum instructed operatives to observe relations of the NTS with the publishers of the journal “Continent.” In order to fuel up tensions between the NTS groups, operatives needed to, among other things, find out whether members of the “Continent” received higher payments than members of the NTS. In general, Mitrokhin suggests that the foremost purpose of the Memorandum was to gather disreputable information and undermine activities of the NTS.