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October 23, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60 Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.
October 14, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 59 Protocol 59 further details the focus of the Soviet Union just before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev was so confident that his plan with Cuba would go unhindered that he spent his efforts on resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict, thinking the matter with missiles was done.
October 11, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 58 Protocol 58 provides insight into what was occupying the mind of Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The theme of the meeting was centered around the Sino-Indian conflict, questions surrounding the McMahon line, and the future of Tibet. With the focus on China and India, it is reasonable to assume that the crisis caught Khrushchev by surprise.
July 12, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 41 Protocol 41 details a meeting on a group of economic advisers sent to Cuba from the Soviet Union.
July 6, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 40 Malin provides notes from Issa Pliev, who would be named commander of Soviet forces in Cuba. They make reference to Kennedy's Independence Day speech, and draft a response, to the remarks made therein.
July 1, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 39 Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.
June 10, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 35 A record of the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This protocol illustrates Khrushchev's confidence in the plan to install missiles in Cuba, although some members still have to approach the operation from a practical standpoint.
May 21, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 32 Protocol 32 gives hint to the consternation Khrushchev faced to have his plan of missiles placed in Cuba approved. It took two separate meetings and four days for the Presidium to conceded to Khrushchev's plan.
November 2, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.
October 27, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."