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Documents

September 1, 1952

Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (CC VKP(b))

The draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) (CC VKP(b)) printed below sharply criticized Soviet media that "inadequately mobilize Soviet people to raise their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialist aggressors" with "pacifist arguments," that ignore the "aggressive measures and plans" of imperialism, and neglect "Marxism-Leninist teaching on the character, sources and causes of war."

October 23, 1981

Cooperative Agreement between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet KGB for the summer of 1981 - 1985

The two parties consent to assist each other in the surveillance of goods going between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, letters going between the two countries and from them to capitalist countries, correspondence sent from Czechoslovak or Soviet citizens to people who recently arrived from capitalist countries, the mailing of anti-socialist materials sent through the two nations and mail involving anti-socialist propaganda sent to either country from capitalist countries. Both parties also agree to exchange information on ways subversives use the post to their advantage and how each country’s officials monitor post suspected of containing ideologically injurious material.

October 24, 1962

Report to the CPSU Central Committee from Department of Agitation and Propaganda

The Department of Agitation and Propaganda asks permission to increase the amount of radio broadcasts from Moscow to Cuba as a means to preempt the 24-hour broadcasts of the US.

March 18, 1979

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan assigning roles to expose outside intervention in Afghanistan and to deal with the deteriorating situation

March 20, 1979

Meeting of Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev with Taraki in Moscow

Meeting of Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev with Taraki in Moscow to discuss the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan and expressing Soviet support for Afghanistan.

May 29, 1980

Protocol #213/39, 29 May 1980

This protocol gives the specifics of Soviet cooperation with the Sandinistas, especially in terms of propaganda (films, photography, Marxist-Leninist literature, etc.).

June 4, 1976

Agreement between the Czechoslovak and Soviet Ministries of the Interior on cooperation from the summer of 1976 until 1980

This plan focuses on developing and strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries in the areas of science, technology, security operations and criminology. It also calls for the sharing of best practices of propaganda methods, roadway security and oversight, education of government officials and administrative organization of bureaus such as the Ministry of the Interior. Provisions are made to exchange methods designed to improve the systems of permit, passport and visa issuance and registration of aliens. The sharing of best practices to reduce alcohol abuse, vagrancy, recidivism and youth crime is discussed as well.

June 2007

Kompromats. Folder 34. The Chekist Anthology.

June 01 2007 - In this entry Mitrokhin explains the importance of having kompromats (a form of grey propaganda used in information warfare against opponents in business and politics) for Soviet anti-socialist activists. Mitrokhin provides two examples of KGB kompromats that played significant roles in repressing oppositionists. In late 1960s the Ukrainian nationalist movement had been growing in popularity. Ivanchenko was one of the radicals who allowed himself to publicly criticize Soviet policies and claimed that Ukraine faced Russification. He organized a club that promoted anti-socialist philosophy. All these facts of his biography were documented by the KGB. Mitrokhin states that Ivanchenko knew many influential Ukrainian nationalists very well. His connections were critical to the KGB. According to Mitrokhin, in 1970 he was blackmailed by the KGB. They used a kompromat: either Ivanchenko became their undercover agent and helped them to fight the anti-socialist movement or he would be excluded from the university and charged for his ideological crimes. Ivanchenko was recruited and his new codename was “Nikolai.” In another example of kompromat Mitrokhin states that in the second half of 1972 Jewish population in Odessa started an opposition movement against the Soviet immigration policies. One of their leaders, Emmanuel Pekar, was once arrested at the Odessa market for selling watches of foreign origin; however he was not charged. Mitrokhin states that Pekar was offered a choice—to become a KGB undercover agent in the Jewish community or go to trial for speculation. Pekar was recruited and his new codename was “Milan.”

Pagination