Kissinger analyzes major considerations in Middle East negotiations in advance of the NSC meeting, concluding that their only reasonable choice at the moment is to press Israel to accept the settlement terms the US develops.

Instructions to prepare a number of studies for various contingencies in the Middle East, including renewed Arab-Israeli conflict, crises related to Jordan, and US-Soviet confrontation.

Kissinger details a plan to hold separate talks with the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain with the aim of bringing them closer to the US position and press them to share responsibility for success.

Kissinger provides Nixon with an overview of achieving a general political settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and different international frameworks for this goal.

Theodore Eliot advises Henry Kissinger that "the United States should avoid becoming involved in an issue which could seriously damage our efforts to improve relations with Peking."

Ceasescu, Nixon and Kissinger discuss issues ranging from European security to the situation in the Middle East.

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it “served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.” It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsafeguarded developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technology.

This document comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliers’ meeting. At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Appended to the guidelines was a two page “trigger list” based on the Zangger Committee’s list.