An intelligence report about both North and South Korea. The report explains what the situation currently is and what is projected to happen with Soviet and American interaction with their respective Koreas.

This report assesses the capabilities of North Korea in reference to; the Soviet position, the current political, economic, and military situations, and the current operations against South Korea.

An intelligence report about both North and South Korea. The report explains what the situation currently is and what is projected to happen with Soviet and American interaction with their respective Koreas.

A summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia produced by the US intelligence community.

The CIA reports that Norway and Denmark have expelled North Korean diplomats for smuggling alcohol and tobacco.

A CIA summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia.

National Intelligence Estimate on Israel concluded that "Israel may have decided to undertake a nuclear weapons program. At a minimum, we believe it has decided to develop its nuclear facilities in such a way as to put it into a position to develop nuclear weapons promptly should it decide to do."

This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

This massively excised report indicates the Agency’s strong views about releasing its knowledge of India’s nuclear weapons activities, even when the information is decades old. That many of the pages are classified “Top Secret Umbra” suggests that some of the information draws on communications intelligence intercepts, another highly sensitive matter.

A Directorate of Intelligence analysis, prepared in 1986, provides an interesting contrast with excisions in the NIEs on the indigenous program; it includes details on the major Navy, Air Force, and Army components of the indigenous program, including the nuclear submarine objective. As with the NIEs, the authors of this report saw no “political decision” on nuclear weapons and further noted President Sarney’s public statements against a weapons program. But a piece of political intelligence initially excised from this report suggested, rightly or wrongly, that Sarney may have been personally ambivalent.