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Documents

February 22, 1972

Memorandum of Conversation between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai

May 23, 1953

Letter by United Nations Commander Mark W. Clark to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Solving the Prisoner of War Issue

General Clark relays to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff the terms of the United Nations proposal to repatriate prisoners of war captured during the conflict in Korea. The agreement grants prisoners the right to refuse to be repatriated.

July 10, 1951

Letter from General Ridgeway to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Ceasefire Negotiations in Korea

Report from Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea on meetings between the UN Command and North Korea to negotiate an armistice in Korea.

November 28, 1950

Letter from General MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea

General MacArthur reports from Tokyo on developments in Korea, stating that the Chinese military support to North Korea was increasing.

February 11, 1945

Yalta Conference Agreement, Declaration of a Liberated Europe

The text of the agreements reached at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin.

April 28, 1966

Report of the Panel on US Government Radio Broadcasting to the Communist Bloc

Panel commissioned by the White House and comprised of Zbigniew Brzezinski, William E. Griffith, John S. Hays, and Richard S. Salant recommends continuation of RFE and RL as covertly funded objective news services, along with VOA and RIAS, discontinuation of public solicitation of private financial donations to RFE, and (Hays dissenting) establishing a Radio Free China

November 19, 1982

Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached memorandum from National Intelligence Council staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan'

Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a “serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”

November 8, 1982

'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan

With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.

June 4, 1982

Note for [name excised] from [name excised], 'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program'

A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.

January 14, 1972

State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?'

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluates the available intelligence on India’s nuclear intentions. There were varying reports that India would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover. Because the U.S. government had given a “relatively modest priority to... relevant intelligence collection activities” a “concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations... may well succeed.” What would motivate India to test, the analysts opined, were domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan.

Pagination