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June 16, 1972

Cable from Holsey G. Handyside to Ronald I. Spiers, 'Guidance on Nuclear Weapons Safety Talks with French'

Handyside sends guidance for discussions with British diplomat Clive Rose on US nuclear assistance to France. The cable outlines points of discussion and emphasizes the secret nature of these talks as "we do not plan to inform French of fact that we are keeping UK generally informed."

August 28, 1972

Memorandum from Ronald I Spiers to John N. Irwin II, 'Military Cooperation with France: Outcome of the Debré Visit'

Discussion of French Minister of Defense Debré's six day visit to the United States in July 1972. The Department of Defense is refusing to share with the Department of State information about technical discussions with Debré's delegation. John Foster, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, may have promised the French "sensitive strategic weapons technology" which cannot be given to them. The French "wish list" of assistance goes beyond the current restrictions to only help with existing systems, and not to provide the French with any new capabilities.

August 24, 1973

Memorandum, from Holsey G. Handyside, Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of Atomic Energy and Aerospace, to Seymour Weiss, 'Speculation: Possibility of High Level Contact Between US and French Governments'

This speculates on the French/U.S. missile connection and notes that Blancard is probably a key player, having most likely met with officials in Washington. Blancard would have reported any such talks to Galley, and so Schlesinger will need to be properly informed about the situation before meeting with Galley.

August 14, 1981

Report on Diplomatic Actions Taken Concerning Foreign, Nuclear-Related Supplies to Pakistan, Richard L. Williamson, Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

ACDA report on the lasting effects of the November 1978 demarches on inverters and plutonium reprocessing technology. Describes the objectives of the demarches and the direct effects on the Pakistani nuclear program, including preventing the shipment of equipment from France, West Germany, Norway, and Switzerland. Concludes with an overview of international norms of nuclear commerce.

Pagination