The U.S. Army investigates what happened in the Katyn Forest in 1940 using the accounts of locals, newspapers, intelligence, and diplomatic correspondence.

Ambassador Steinhardt on rumors that the Soviet Union is planning to take control of Latvia and Estonia.

A memorandum from the US Army's Intelligence Division, detailing the Army’s contingency plan in the event of a communist takeover in Italy's 1948 parliamentary elections.

Director of the US Army’s Intelligence Division at the Pentagon, Lieutenant General Stephen J. Chamberlin, instructed American military attachés from eight European capitals to meet with one of his subordinates, Colonel Riley F. Ennis, for a conference in Frankfurt am Main in Germany on March 24 to discuss intelligence matters pertaining to Soviet activities in Germany.

A Directorate of Intelligence analysis, prepared in 1986, provides an interesting contrast with excisions in the NIEs on the indigenous program; it includes details on the major Navy, Air Force, and Army components of the indigenous program, including the nuclear submarine objective. As with the NIEs, the authors of this report saw no “political decision” on nuclear weapons and further noted President Sarney’s public statements against a weapons program. But a piece of political intelligence initially excised from this report suggested, rightly or wrongly, that Sarney may have been personally ambivalent.

Martin Jacobs reports that Dr. J. V. Retief, Senior Scientist of the National Nuclear Research Center of the South African Atomic Energy Board requested permission to visit an Army Corps research facility, the Cratering Group Research Labratory at Livermore, California. Jacobs was concerned that "there might be political repercussions if it appeared the US was assisting South Africa to produce nuclear explosives as a prelude to weapons development."

A collection of speeches of Kim Il Sung, Kim Du-bong, Choe Yong-geon, and Kim Dal-hyeon on the Korean People's Army in 1948.

A Central Intelligence Agency assessment of the origins of the Northern Limit Line.

Bohlen informs Dulles of the transfer of Soviet Control in East Germany, which does not yet provide much indication of future Soviet policy in East Germany except the solidification of East Germany's continued existence under the control of the USSR.