Skip to content

Results:

21 - 30 of 45

Documents

September 15, 1959

Mikihail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt)

Mikhail Zimyanin, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, reports to Khrushchev on the “new stage” in Sino-Soviet relations after the victory of the people’s revolution in China; China and the Soviet Union now share the common goal of developing socialist societies in their respective countries.

April 5, 1956

From the Journal of Ambassador P. F. Yudin, Record of Conversation with Mao Zedong, 31 March 1956

Soviet Ambassador Yudin discusses the 20th Congress of the CPSU with Mao, including Khrushchev's "secret speech" denouncing Stalin and his cult of personality. Mao had already seen a copy and discusses mistakes in Stalin's policy towards China at length.

May 24, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 32 (continued)

The Presidium decides to adopt Protocol 32.

August 3, 1960

Note from USSR Embassy to the USA Relayed by Gromyko to Khrushchev, 'John Fitzgerald Kennedy - Political Character Sketch'

Andrei Gromyko forwards to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy.

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

November 16, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63

According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.

October 27, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 62

Protocol 62 illustrates how it was Khrushchev who raised the stakes during the missile crisis and dictated a new letter to Kennedy indicating he would only remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange of the United States withdrawing its military bases from Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistan demand would later be dropped, however and the US would only agree to remove its IRBMs from Turkey.

October 25, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 61

Protocol 61 indicates Khrushchev was already taking steps away from the crisis unfolding. Khrushchev decided that the ships carrying the IRBM missiles (the R-14s) on the high seas should turn around and come home.

Pagination