Soviet guidance to its ambassador in Havana on the establishment of a Latin American nuclear free zone. Soviet concerns are voiced about the possibility of the treaty impeding on the transit of nuclear weapons in large areas of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

In response to requests from the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, the CC CPSU agrees to supply arms which will be sent from the Soviet Union to the Republic of Cuba, and then provided during the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the People’s Republic of Angola.

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Mario Monje, informs Chestnoy about a recent meeting with Che Guevara, in which they discuss the differences in Chinese Communist leadership policies. Guevara states that if forced to choose between the two sides, Cuban leadership would be on the side of the Soviet Union.

A member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Istvan Tempe, describes his impressions of Cuba upon his visit for the fourth anniversary of the Cuban revolution. He notes that while the Cuban population has positive opinion of the Soviet Union, their Communist leadership is generally insufficient.

The Presidium decides to adopt Protocol 32.

An excerpt on Cuba from Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev's secret speech, “About Current Problems of the International Situation and the Struggle of the CPSU for the Cohesion of the World Communist Movement,” to the CPSU CC Plenum on 9 April 1968.

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.