Protocol 41 details a meeting on a group of economic advisers sent to Cuba from the Soviet Union.

Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.

A record of the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This protocol illustrates Khrushchev's confidence in the plan to install missiles in Cuba, although some members still have to approach the operation from a practical standpoint.

Protocol 32 gives hint to the consternation Khrushchev faced to have his plan of missiles placed in Cuba approved. It took two separate meetings and four days for the Presidium to conceded to Khrushchev's plan.

Report on the American effort to spread false rumors about the arrival of Soviet military equipments and personnel in Cuba. To counter this subversive attempt, the Cuban security organs has established full control of foreign correspondence and captured maps and intelligence reports.

The response from the Soviet Army following the announcement of the Soviet government about the aggressive actions of the US toward Cuba.

Bakaev tells the CC CPSU that Soviet ships en route to Cuba are subject to overhead flights and surveillance by Americans.

The Department of Agitation and Propaganda asks permission to increase the amount of radio broadcasts from Moscow to Cuba as a means to preempt the 24-hour broadcasts of the US.