This document discusses the creation of an independent Korea. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek first presented the idea at the Cairo Conference in 1943. The United States supports the creation of a single Korean state while the USSR opposes it. The document discusses the importance of the answer to the unification question for the Soviet Union's political and economic future as well as its interest in the Far East.

Petro Gedeshi and Kurt Schneidewind argue about the Soviet decision to recall specialists from the China. Kim Il Sung understands the delay of Khrushchev's visit to the DPRK and suggests that it be rescheduled for spring 1961.

S.P. Kozyrev and the Canadian Ambassador review Soviet policy toward the resolution of the Pueblo Incident and the connections between developments in Vietnam and the military situation on the Korean Peninsula.

S.P. Kozyrev and J. Rowland debate the reasons behind the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula. Though Rowland is emphatic that the Soviet Union ought to pressure the DPRK to cease provocations, Kozyrev insists that the "DPRK is an independent country."

A record of conversation on the question of the withdrawal of the US troops from South Korea and the tense situation along the demarcation line.

The memorandum elaborates on the rapid economic growth and development in domestic policies in the DPRK after the Korean War.

Pak Seong-cheol claims that the American forces in South Korea are a hindrance in the way of reunification and comments on Soviet-North Korean relations and Japan.

Message to Vyshinsky that U.S. proposals for a ceasefire should not be accepted as they are negotiating from a position of weakness after several defeats.

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.