Petro Gedeshi and Kurt Schneidewind argue about the Soviet decision to recall specialists from the China. Kim Il Sung understands the delay of Khrushchev's visit to the DPRK and suggests that it be rescheduled for spring 1961.

Mao Zedong informs Roshchin that India and Burma had expressed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with China, and that the UK may follow suit. The Chinese position, Mao said, is to agree to negotiations if these governments renounced their ties with the Guomindang. Mao and Roshchin also discussed the military situation and the question of Japanese POWs. Mao did not the POWs right away because the Chinese legal system was not developed enough. He also informed Roshchin of his intention to curtain stay in the USSR.

A conversation held between Soviet Ambassador to China Pavel Yudin and Mao Zedong. The discussion primarily concerned the activity of the peasantry in China joining collective farms, the development of the agricultural sector of the economy, and Chinese food aid to India and Burma.

A telegram from Stalin to Zhou Enlai with regards to India's mediation in the PRC's entry into the UN, Chinese troop movements in preparation for a possible Southern/Allied counterattack, and Soviet planes flying over Manchuria.

Deng Xiaoping discuss Khrushchev's speech regarding the American U-2 spy plane shot down by the Soviet Union in May 1960 and the Eisenhower administration's attempted cover up. He also discussed Zhou Enlai's visit to India and continued tensions between India and China.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and PRC Ambassador to the USSR Zhang Wentian discuss their respective views on the situations in Korea and Vietnam in preparation for the upcoming Geneva Conference.

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

Mao, via Zhou Enlai, informs Stalin of the position China means to take the discussion of the Korean question at the UN. Mao also asks Stalin’s advise about whether or not to sign non-aggression pacts with India and Burma.