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June 13, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 20772, Roshchin to Comrade Filippov [Stalin], containing a Message from Mao Zedong

Response to Stalin’s telegram from the same day. Mao tells Stalin that Peng Dehuai needs Soviet advisers and gives some details about the current military situation in Korea.

June 24, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 3777, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Cde. Mao Zedong

Stalin’s response to Mao’s 21 June telegram, turning down his request for further arms and discussing the possibility of armistice.

June 1960

From the Diary of S. V. Chervonenko, Memorandum of Conversation with the General Secretary of the CC CCP, Deng Xiaoping, 17 May 1960

Deng Xiaoping discuss Khrushchev's speech regarding the American U-2 spy plane shot down by the Soviet Union in May 1960 and the Eisenhower administration's attempted cover up. He also discussed Zhou Enlai's visit to India and continued tensions between India and China.

January 17, 1950

Conversation, V.M. Molotov and A.Y Vyshinsky with Mao Zedong, Moscow, 17 January 1950

In this conversation Molotov reads out to Mao the part of Acheson's Jan. 12 statement about the Soviet take-over of Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang. Molotov proposes that the Chinese Foreign Ministry issues a refutation. Mao suggests that Xinhua should do that, but Molotov disagrees, and Mao promises that the Foreign Ministry will issue a statement. Mao, for his part, mentions several US probes to establish relations with Communist China, but notes that his policy is to keep the Americans at arms' length, and, in fact, to force them to leave China altogether. Towards the end Molotov and Mao discuss China's representation at the UN (Molotov asks that China appoint a representative, something that Mao appears reluctant to do), and China's representation at the Allied Control Council for Japan.

January 6, 1950

Conversation between A. Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong, Moscow

In this conversation Mao and Vyshinskii talk about Sino-Soviet economic cooperation, including Soviet aid in rebuilding the Jilin power plant and provision of fuel supplies. The conversation the turns on the question of Japanese POWs. Mao wants to leave them in the USSR for a while longer, and Vyshinskii agrees. Finally, Mao tells Vyshinskii that he is of the opinion that the USSR and China must sign a new treaty of alliance, to which Vyshinskii (possibly unaware of the TASS interview) replies that he sees difficulties in this.

March 6, 1954

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation between Molotov and PRC Ambassador Zhang Wentian

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and PRC Ambassador to the USSR Zhang Wentian discuss their respective views on the situations in Korea and Vietnam in preparation for the upcoming Geneva Conference.

July 5, 1954

From the Journal of V. V. Vaskov, 27 August 1954: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong on 5 July 1954

Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Beijing V.V. Vaskov and Comrade Mao Zedong discuss the Soviet plans to take advantage of the changing situation in France. Mao mentions that Zhou is meeting with Ho Chi Ming and Vo Nguyen Giap in Guanxi and won't be able to come to Geneva until July 12-13. The topic of conversation then shifts to the US and a recent meeting between US President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Mao notes that there is a diverge between Eisenhower and Churchill regarding the desirability of a dialogue with the Communists. Mao says that the US has dispersed its forces far and wide, so they are trying to resurrect West Germany and Japan.

November 2, 1962

Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

August 28, 1951

CC Politburo decision with approved message from Stalin to Mao Zedong

Stalin agrees with Mao on the steps taken in response to the attacks, Stalin does not agree in inviting neutral countries to negotiations.

September 16, 1952

Hand delivered note, Zhou Enlai to Stalin, conveying telegram From Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai

Mao, via Zhou Enlai, informs Stalin of the position China means to take the discussion of the Korean question at the UN. Mao also asks Stalin’s advise about whether or not to sign non-aggression pacts with India and Burma.

Pagination