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July 16, 1954

From the Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov describes his earlier conversations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Vietnamese Vice-Premier Pham Van Dong. Eden told Molotov in their conversation that he preferred military issues to be primarily in the cease-fire agreement between Vietnam and France, rather than in France’s draft of its Geneva Conference declaration. Molotov’s discussion with Mendes-France dealt with elections in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Vietnam.

January 17, 1962

Entry from the Journal of Soviet Ambassador to India I.A. Benediktov

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Bhupesh Gupta. During the conversation, Gupta urgently requests Soviet financial aid for the Indian party for use in an upcoming election campaign; the answer conveyed by Benediktov ten days later suggests that the Soviets responded positively to the request, although the amount is not indicated.

October 10, 1962

Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with "Comrade E"

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with the charge d'affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, Comrade E Cheng-Cheng, referred to as "Comrade E." in the document. In the conversation, the Chinese official gave Beijing's version of the building Sino-Indian border confrontation, blaming India for attacking Chinese posts along the border, and asserting that India had "gone too far" to resume normal relations with the PRC. Ten days later, China launched a broad attack on Indian positions along the disputed frontier.

October 26, 1962

Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."

November 2, 1962

Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru

Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

December 25, 1951

Memorandum from Gromyko to Razuvaev

Gromyko suggests to Stalin, via Razuvaev, to turn down Vyshinsky’s proposal for publishing a communiqué about the American position in the armistice talks.

September 16, 1952

Hand delivered note, Zhou Enlai to Stalin, conveying telegram From Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai

Mao, via Zhou Enlai, informs Stalin of the position China means to take the discussion of the Korean question at the UN. Mao also asks Stalin’s advise about whether or not to sign non-aggression pacts with India and Burma.

November 21, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.

February 3, 1952

Ciphered Telegram No. 709, Filippov [Stalin] to Krasovsky, for Mao Zedong

Telegram to Mao from Stalin approving of Mao's progress at the armistice talks and reminding him to have Polish and Czech included in the commission of observers.

July 16, 1952

Ciphered Telegram No. 502597, Razuvaev to Cdes. Vasilevsky and Vyshinsky, transmitting message from Kim Il Sung to I.V. Stalin

Telegram from Kim Il Sung to Stalin stating the current situation of the armistice talks and the pressure which is being exerted upon North Korea by uninhibited American air power. He makes a request for additional anti-aircraft support from the Soviet Union and China, which he believes will lead to a more advantageous bargaining position at the negotiating table.

Pagination