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Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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Puzanov, A. M.

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Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912- 1994

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Sino-Soviet Relations

Cuban Foreign Relations

Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Photograph of 38th parallel crossing during Korean War

Korean War, 1950-1953

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Soviet Union-North Korea Relations

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

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Nam, Il

1915- 1976

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Soviet Union. Embassy (Korea : North)

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October 26, 1962	Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."
November 13, 1950	Telegram from Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow Soviet advice to North Korea concerning the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly on the Korea issue.
November 2, 1962	Entry from the Journal of Soviet ambassador to India Benediktov, Conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai--with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier--opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."
August 28, 1951	CC Politburo decision with approved message from Stalin to Mao Zedong Stalin agrees with Mao on the steps taken in response to the attacks, Stalin does not agree in inviting neutral countries to negotiations.
December 25, 1951	Memorandum from Gromyko to Razuvaev Gromyko suggests to Stalin, via Razuvaev, to turn down Vyshinsky’s proposal for publishing a communiqué about the American position in the armistice talks.
March 5, 1952	Memorandum from Gromyko to Stalin Message from Gromyko (MID) to Stalin advising against the proposal of Amb. Razuvaev to publish an interview of Kim Il Sung on the grounds that it is inflammatory and rash.
September 16, 1952	Hand delivered note, Zhou Enlai to Stalin, conveying telegram From Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai Mao, via Zhou Enlai, informs Stalin of the position China means to take the discussion of the Korean question at the UN. Mao also asks Stalin’s advise about whether or not to sign non-aggression pacts with India and Burma.
June 24, 1953	Report from Vasilii Sokolovskii, Vladimir Semyonov, and Pavel Yudin, 'On the Events of 17-19 June 1953 in Berlin and the GDR and Certain Conclusions from these Events' The authors accuse "fascist and other organizations, working primarily under the leadership of American intelligence," to be responsible for the uprisings in Berlin and other GDR cities. The authors stated that "Adenauer intended to exploit this disenchantment to strengthen his position before the upcoming Bundestag elections in August-September of this year." The CC SED is accused having not paid attention to short-lived strikes in early June. According to the authors "the events in Berlin on 16-19 June were completely unexpected to the leadership of GDR". Finally the authors drew a few conclusions and gave some recommendations "in order to correct the situation in the GDR."
November 19, 1951	Soviet Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Razuvaev Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev requiring more clear explanation about the earlier inquiry regarding Korean situation.
November 20, 1951	Gromyko to G.M. Malenkov, attaching draft telegram to Razuvaev Telegram from from Gromkyo to Malenkov asking for a review of a draft telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Razuvaev. The draft chastises Razuvaev for permitting the North Koreans to make an appeal before the UN without first consulting the Soviet Union or China.