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Documents

February 27, 1975

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 059.057

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang reports on the military responses of North and South Korea to the growing number of clashes near the Northern Limit Line (NLL).

April 22, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.180

Heo Dam seeks to replace the armistice with a peace treaty and establish direct contact with the United States to remove American troops from the peninsula.

March 24, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.127

In the aftermath of the failed inter-Korean dialogues, the North Koreans conclude that they must establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The telegram describes the rationale behind the move and the goal of limiting the interference of the United States on the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, North Korea believes that the rejection of the US to establish relations with the DPRK will expose Washington's opposition to the unification of Korea.

February 21, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.076

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang reports on the February 15 naval clash between North and South Korea, and how the sides had responded to the incident

December 6, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537

The document describes how the North Koreans enthusiastically celebrated the consensus of Committee No. 1 over the Korean issue in the UN; however, Lazar believes that the Korean leadership has not actually grasped the full implications of the decision. In addition, the telegram describes how Pyongyang's attempt to reassert control over South Korean islands close to the North Korean shores in the Yellow Sea has created friction between the two countries. The author also mentions that North Korean support for the student movements in South Korea legitimized Seoul's harsher crackdown on the dissident movements.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.530

The telegram highlights the new South Korean effort to normalize relations with China and the USSR. Both Soviet and Chinese officials reject the overture from South Korea.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312

The document describes a consensus at the UN regarding the Korean issue after an understanding was reached between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Thea author observes that some of the US media believes that the US came to a compromise solution with China because Nixon wanted to avoid having more political issues.

November 15, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061.465, Urgent

The document describes several gatherings of Korean People's Army corps in Pyongyang where military leaders presented a report underlying the necessity of increasing the level of technical and combat preparedness of the army. The author observes how the rhetoric of driving out "American imperialists" and unifying the peninsula had reappeared in North Korea.

November 3, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.497

Following the end of the inter-Korean dialogue, Zhivkov observes increased antagonism in the rhetoric of the North Koreans regarding unification paralleling the increasing tension between the two Koreas.

October 27, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061482, Urgent

Popa notes Kim Yeong-nam's concern regarding interference of the USSR and USA in the Yom Kippur/October War as a source of a wider conflict, contrary to the optimism expressed by the North Korean leadership.

Pagination