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Documents

May 10, 1975

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 059.156

At a recent state visit of the DPRK delegation to the PRC, both countries look at the developments in Indochina as positive and as predicted changes to the Korean Peninsula. Beijing agrees to increase trade and economic cooperation with North Korea while promising to keep distance from Seoul.

May 9, 1975

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, No. 052.467

While the UN looks for ways to dismantle the UN headquarters in South Korea while preserving the armistice, the telegram notes that the North Koreans are attempting to bypass the UN as a whole and come to an understanding with the United States directly.

March 25, 1975

Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 059.101

Popa describes the breakdown of the negotiations at the North-South Coordination Committee, which has devolved into an "organized exchange of accusations and labels." He notes that the discovery of tunnels beneath the DMZ and other conditions have made it impossible to stall the rising tensions on the peninsula.

August 19, 1974

The Official Visit Paid by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The document describes a cordial bilateral relationship between the DPRK and Romania. Pyongyang expresses its desire to continue consulting with Bucharest regarding the issue of dismantling UN bodies in South Korea. In addition, North Korea notes the imperative of establishing direct contact with the United States and plans on using Washington's positive or negative response to its advantage.

July 18, 1974

The Foreign Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its Position towards the Main International Matters

The North Korea outline the direction of its foreign policy. Mainly, Pyongyang seeks to expand the number of countries that it maintains diplomatic relations with and ascend to international organizations. The DPRK hopes to replaces the 1953 armistice with a peace treaty that will facilitate the eventual unification of the Korean peninsula. The document also notes North Korea's tumultuous relationships with the communist powers. The source observes that while there have been reservations in the relationship with the USSR, ties with the PRC have continued to grow.

April 22, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.180

Heo Dam seeks to replace the armistice with a peace treaty and establish direct contact with the United States to remove American troops from the peninsula.

March 24, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.127

In the aftermath of the failed inter-Korean dialogues, the North Koreans conclude that they must establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The telegram describes the rationale behind the move and the goal of limiting the interference of the United States on the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, North Korea believes that the rejection of the US to establish relations with the DPRK will expose Washington's opposition to the unification of Korea.

December 6, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537

The document describes how the North Koreans enthusiastically celebrated the consensus of Committee No. 1 over the Korean issue in the UN; however, Lazar believes that the Korean leadership has not actually grasped the full implications of the decision. In addition, the telegram describes how Pyongyang's attempt to reassert control over South Korean islands close to the North Korean shores in the Yellow Sea has created friction between the two countries. The author also mentions that North Korean support for the student movements in South Korea legitimized Seoul's harsher crackdown on the dissident movements.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.530

The telegram highlights the new South Korean effort to normalize relations with China and the USSR. Both Soviet and Chinese officials reject the overture from South Korea.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312

The document describes a consensus at the UN regarding the Korean issue after an understanding was reached between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Thea author observes that some of the US media believes that the US came to a compromise solution with China because Nixon wanted to avoid having more political issues.

Pagination