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March 11, 1975

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059.076

Popa observes an increase of US military presence in South Korea, including the transfer of nuclear weapons and notes that many see this move as Washington's way of coping with the Sino-Soviet split and increased division between Japan and the US.

August 19, 1974

The Official Visit Paid by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The document describes a cordial bilateral relationship between the DPRK and Romania. Pyongyang expresses its desire to continue consulting with Bucharest regarding the issue of dismantling UN bodies in South Korea. In addition, North Korea notes the imperative of establishing direct contact with the United States and plans on using Washington's positive or negative response to its advantage.

May 8, 1974

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 78.028

The Romanian representative in Washington note the delivery of the North Korean message to the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The telegram notes that the US State Department does not wish this kind of communication between Pyongyang and Washington to be permanent.

April 22, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.180

Heo Dam seeks to replace the armistice with a peace treaty and establish direct contact with the United States to remove American troops from the peninsula.

March 24, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.127

In the aftermath of the failed inter-Korean dialogues, the North Koreans conclude that they must establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The telegram describes the rationale behind the move and the goal of limiting the interference of the United States on the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, North Korea believes that the rejection of the US to establish relations with the DPRK will expose Washington's opposition to the unification of Korea.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312

The document describes a consensus at the UN regarding the Korean issue after an understanding was reached between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Thea author observes that some of the US media believes that the US came to a compromise solution with China because Nixon wanted to avoid having more political issues.

October 27, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061482, Urgent

Popa notes Kim Yeong-nam's concern regarding interference of the USSR and USA in the Yom Kippur/October War as a source of a wider conflict, contrary to the optimism expressed by the North Korean leadership.

July 31, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 091.722, Normal

Romanians note that the Chinese are worried about the possible vacuum left behind on the Korean Peninsula if the US withdraws from South Korea. The telegram notes that the Chinese will not oppose continued US presence in South Korea even after the dissolution of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

June 26, 1973

Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.605, Urgent, SECRET

Romanian officials in Washington report that they submitted the letter from the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, intended for the US congress, to the US State Department. The US official in contact with the Romanians described North Korea's attitudes towards the joint accession of the two Koreas to the UN as unrealistic.

June 25, 1973

Telegram from Beijing, No.059.658, Urgent, SECRET

Romanian official comments on statements made by Premier Zhou Enlai that appeared on China's Renmin Ribao. The official notes that Zhou does not condition Sino-American relations on US withdrawal from South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam. In fact, the official comments how Taiwan is overlooked and withdrawal of US troops from Korea is characterized as a request from Kim Il Sung.

Pagination