1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
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Germany
1888- 1959
1890- 1969
1930- 2017
1912- 1994
1943-
October 16, 1953
A CIA report presents an assessment of the damages and monetary value of the damages following the East German Uprising, estimated by East German governmental offices.
September 10, 1953
A CIA report presents information about the aftermath of the East German Uprising and known plans and actions taken by the SED in terms of arrests and reconstruction efforts.
July 13, 1953
A series of intelligence information regarding strike plans throughout Eastern Germany.
June 24, 1953
This CIA report states that the recent uprising revealed the Eastern German Communist regime’s dependence on Soviet military force to maintain power and enforce order. Based on activity of Soviet forces, indications of future Soviet intentions in Germany and in Europe are also discussed.
June 21, 1953
Charles Bohlen, ambassador to the Soviet Union, speculates on liberalization reforms in East Germany and their potential impact on Soviet leadership and the reaction of other Satellite nations, following the East German uprising.
A CIA report states updates regarding East German workers, many of which had fled to West Berlin during the uprising on June 16-17, and their plan to continue resistance at their place of employment.
June 18, 1953
A CIA report discusses new policy modification in East Germany following the East German Uprising. It is reported that measures are being taken by the regime to relieve political and economic tension and to improve the quality of life in East Germany. This includes shifting the some of the production of heavy machinery to the production of consumer goods. The report also reviews details on recent social unrest in Eastern Europe.
June 19, 1953
The US National Security Council discusses recent release of prisoners of war in South Korea. The riots and disturbances in East Germany and Czechoslovakia are discussed in the context of the general “softening” of Soviet policy. The Council also discusses the possibility of a four-power meeting, and other alternative courses of action.