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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

Eastern Europe

East Germany

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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East German Uprising

Photograph of Gorbachev-Bush summit at Malta, 1989

End of the Cold War

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Anastas Mikoyan in 1959

Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich

1895- 1978

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

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Central Africa

Angola

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879- 1953

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893- 1976

Sino-Soviet Relations

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931- 2022

Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1950

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

Photograph of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, 1945

Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950

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November 13, 1962	Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.
November 11, 1962	Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.
October 27, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."
October 23, 1962	Ciphered Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.
January 19, 1954	Central Intelligence Agency, NIE 12.4-54, Probable Developments in Eastern Germany Through 1955 Estimating the current situation and probable developments in East Germany through 1955.
November 25, 1980	Activities of Opposition Elements at the Gdansk Shipyard - On the Conditions of the New Social-Political Situation Report on the situation in the Gdansk Shipyard. Also discusses the opposition's methods, and individual members of the opposition.
May 29, 1953	CIA Report Evaluating Vladimir Semyonov’s Appointment as Soviet High Commissioner for Germany A CIA report presents an analysis of the dissolution of the Soviet Control Commission (SCC) and the return of V.S. Semyonov to Germany as the Soviet High Commissioner for Germany.
June 19, 1953	CIA Current Intelligence Digest 'Comment on Berlin Rioting' According to the CIA report, as of the 19th of June, the situation in East Berlin has been repressed by Soviet troops and the East German police, and inter-sector traffic is strictly controlled. However, in other areas of East Germany, strikes and disturbances are still being reported.
July 10, 1953	CIA Special Supplement to the Current Intelligence Weekly This CIA report contains a chronological breakdown of the nature and extent of the riots and demonstrations in East Germany, and descriptions of the Soviet reaction, East German capabilities, East German government reaction, and the Soviet policy reaction. According to the report, at this point, the USSR has not yet revealed any long-term policy reaction to the German situation.
July 21, 1953	Intelligence Advisory Committee, Special Estimate (SE-47), 'Probable Effect Of Recent Developments In Eastern Germany On Soviet Policy With Respect To Germany' This intelligence report presents and analyzes Soviet policy in East Germany before, during, and after the East German Uprising. The report assesses potential actions the Soviets could take in the future towards East Germany, and the likelihood of each.