Skip to content

Results:

81 - 90 of 125

Documents

June 25, 1976

Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Soviet-Korean relations deteriorate, as Korea falls behind in commercial deliveries and the Soviet Union declines to deliver a nuclear power plant.

August 9, 1976

Memorandum, Branch Office of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade in Pyongyang to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade

Memorandum from 1976 Intergovernmental Consultative Commission, in which Korea's inability to maintain levels of trade in raw materials has negatively affected Soviet production. North Korea again asks for a nuclear power plant.

February 29, 1980

Report on the Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the Socialist Countries in Moscow, 26 February 1980

This document explains the views of the cooperating Socialist countries relating to Afghanistan. The USSR perceived the US attempt to line up NATO support against the Soviets as an aggressive action, designed to counter Soviet influence. The Soviets, by contrast, viewed their involvement in Afghanistan as increasing their sphere of influence around the Warsaw-pact countries, making such actions defense, rather than offensive. The USSR's leadership states that it should increase its ties to NATO countries to counteract the foreign policy of the US.

July 16, 1980

Memorandum of conversation between Vadim Zagladin of the CPSU CC and Gyula Horn, deputy head of the HSWP CC Foreign Department on debates inside the Soviet leadership on issues of international politics

This document reveals substantial internal debate among Soviet policy makers regarding the USSR'S foreign policy. Issues of counter-balancing US influence by increasing alliances in Western Europe, and the disagreement regarding political turmoil in Afghanistan, illustrate two prominent disagreements in Soviet politics.

1980

Soviet briefing on the correspondence between Tito and Brezhnev

This document reveals correspondence between Brezhnev and Tito. Tito expresses his worries about international politics relating to NATO's decision regarding long/medium range missiles, and advocates for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Brezhnev emphasizes the ideological and pragmatic importance of Soviet involvement in the Middle East, and discusses the role of NATO in Europe.

1980

Soviet briefing on the need to counter-balance Yugoslav endeavors concerning the Afghan question in the non-aligned countries

This document provides an assessment of Yugoslavia’s policy regarding non-aligned countries. The Soviet Union analyses how to counter-balance the non-alignment movement with its foreign policy. The topic of non-interference in internal political matters, and the opinion of Ghana, Kuwait, and India regarding Soviet involvement in Afghanistan are discussed.

October 29, 1980

Soviet briefing on the talks between Brezhnev and B. Karmal in Moscow

This document reveals Babrak Karmal's positive views of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Karmal thanks Soviet leadership for substantial economic and political support, discussing the integration of Soviet economic reforms into the Afghan economy. Karmal states that the turmoil within Afghan political parties is almost solved, and is progressing towards unity.

July 18, 1967

Minutes of HSWP Politburo meeting held on 18 July 1967

The Polish Political Committee makes recommendations to hold talks in Moscow aimed at "harmonizing positions on this policy of the Communist Party of China" based upon a proposal from the International Department.

February 16, 1980

Ciphered Telegram, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

A report from the Hungarian Embassy in India explaining that in the view of the Indian government, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatens regional stability as it could invite American and/or Chinese intervention.

November 3, 1956

Imre Horvath’s Notes of Khrushchev’s Speech at the 3 November Session

In this speech, Khrushchev admits that the lack of Hungarian leaders is his own fault. He criticizes Rakosi and Gero for poor leadership and for excluding Imre Nagy from the party. Regret is expressed for not removing Rakosi earlier. Khrushchev states that the Soviet Union can not be on the sidelines, and remarks that unless forced into retirement Nagy will work with the enemy.

Pagination