This document contains the East German (GDR) Embassy in China’s summary and preliminary evaluation of Chinese foreign policy aimed at achieving super power status, domestic militarization in China, and efforts to foster political unity around Maoist ideology.

Ambassadors to China from Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria, and Mongolia discuss Chinese preparations for war, Maoist groups in Western Europe and Japan, and other aspects of Chinese foreign policy.

Ambassadors to China from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Mongolia discuss Chinese border provocations, the ninth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and other aspects of Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

Notes on a meeting between the Ambassadors to China of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Poland in which they discussed a broad range of domestic and international concerns related to the People’s Republic of China including the Cultural Revolution, Vietnam, and provocations at the Soviet border. They report throughout on conversations with other Ambassadors in China.

Notes on a meeting between the Ambassadors to China of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Poland, in which they discussed a border incident at the Ussuri River, among other recent developments in China.

Notes on acting Ambassador of the USSR in the People’s Republic of China Alexei Yalisavetin’s remarks to German Democratic Republic Ambassador Gustav Hertzfeldtt about what he viewed as China’s troubling anti-Sovietism as well as the PRC’s attempt at rapprochement with America and West Germany. Yalisavetin also discussed the eventuality of Mao Zedong’s death and named Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Yao Wenyuan as likely successors.

Information on a Czechoslovak delegation to the DRV. The Czechoslovak delegation assess the Vietnamese situation and determine that the Vietnamese successes are overestimated while American strength and fighting potential are underestimated. The Czechoslovak and Vietnamese groups disagree on China, with the Czechoslovak delegation saying the Vietnamese are simply unable to take a stance against China because it would jeopardize the aid they are receiving.

Conversation with First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Sverev, describing the Vietnamese attitude toward China as becoming colder. At the same time, printing of China's anti-Soviet propaganda has become more limited and the Vietnamese appear grateful for Soviet aid. Sverev also estimates that there are over 200,000 Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam.

Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov reported that Vietnamese officers lately seem defensive and not trusting, while emphasizing their autonomy. Also states that Ho Chi Minh was made to promise not to talk with the US or call for volunteers from socialist countries without first consulting the Chinese.

Minister Counselor of the DRV Embassy Hoan Muoi expresses his belief that there will be no international conference on Vietnam until there is a reconciliation between the USSR and China. He asserts that Kruschev damaged the world Communist movement, but also that China's objections to Soviet aid to Vietnam are unjustified.