A description of the political and economic situation in South and North Korea, and on the presence of the struggling democratic and reactionary forces and their influence among the people. Attached are three appendices on the combat and strength of the South Korean and the People's Army of North Korea, the amount of weapons in the People's Army, and the amount of ammunition in the People's Army as of August 1, 1949.

Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Shtykov reports that South Korean forces were being expanded with US assistance and that the government of President Syngman Rhee was taking steps to increase the combat readiness of its army.

Molotov writes to the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing discussing the Korean War armistice.

The cable contains Stalin’s personal response to Mao's 13 May telegram. Using the code-name “Filippov,” Stalin confirms his agreement with the North Korean proposal to “move toward reunification,” contingent on Beijing’s agreement.

After acknowledging Syngman Rhee's solitary role in blocking the passage of the armistice agreement, Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung draft a response to General Clark.

Telegram from Amb. Rauvaev to Stalin reporting on the changes planned in the structure of the KPA, per Stalin's telegram of 30 January

Telegram from Krasvosky to Stalin reporting on the conversation he had with Mao concerning the training of Chinese pilots in MIG-15s and the contruction of three airbases south of Pyongyang.

Stalin clarifies that his previous telegram of 30 January was not an order, but a proposal to discuss options with Korea.

Message from Gromyko (MID) to Stalin advising against the proposal of Amb. Razuvaev to publish an interview of Kim Il Sung on the grounds that it is inflammatory and rash.

A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.