Brezhnev and Honecker discuss issues related to Poland, including the need for stabilization of the Polish crisis and the composition of the new Politburo.

Leonid Brezhnev and East European communist leaders discuss the strikes of the 1980-1981 Polish crisis and their aftermath and causes, including the formation of the Solidarity Union. The repercussions of the crisis for socialism in Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries is discussed, as well as possible measures to counter the anti-socialist uprising.

Memorandum Regarding the Meeting Between Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Erich Honecker, and Gustav Husak in the Kremlin describing the Polish situation and criticizing Polish leadership

Leonid Brezhnev writes to East German leader Erich Honecker, regarding the Polish Crisis. Brezhnev suggests that the Soviet Union reduce oil shipments to the GDR, in order to alleviate Poland's economic crisis.

Arif and Boumedienne talked to Brezhnev and Kossygin about the Six-Day War and discussed with them the possibilities for the Arab countries. The first possibility is to negotiate with the US and Israel and the second, to continue fighting, regardless of the cost. The Algerian representatives favored the second option, suggesting that otherwise an overthrow of the progressive Arab governments would be likely. Brezhnev and Kossygin argued, however, that a political solution would be more appropriate and that the main goal at the present time should be to strengthen the armies of Syria, Jordan and the UAR, and to support these countries in every respect.

Transcript of Brezhnev Honecker summit in East Berlin (excerpt on Iran and Afghanistan) with Brezhnev discussing the leadership of Amin and expressing continued Soviet support for Afghanistan

In this meeting, Brezhnev expresses anxiety about Poland's path, especially since it has deteriorated since Congress when it was expected to improve. Kania says that the political crisis can be overcome and that theyare seizing the initiative. Brezhnev insists that they will soon face off with the enemy, and there is still the opportunity to mobilize and rebuff the counterrevolution. Brezhnev concludes that large scale political action is the most feasible way to turn Poland to socialism.

Brezhnev worries the Polish Solidarity movement will undermine communist authority in Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe.

East German Document describing the speech by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This German translation of Brezhnev's speech was circulated to the SED leadership.

Brezhnev appeals to Assad to continue his support for the PLO. He blames the passivity of the other Arab states for the critical military situation in Lebanon.