This order from the Ministry of State Security describes the tasks of the MfS units concerning efforts to uncover intentions of aggression and surprise military activities by western states and their allies, especially a surprise nuclear missile attack against the USSR.

These notes describe statements made by Colonel General Kryuchkov which outline the current state of Soviet institutions and intelligence networks in various regions, including Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States.

This report describes conversations with Comrade Kryuchkov, coving a multitude of subjects, but delving briefly into the problem of "prevention of a surprise nuclear attack" (RYAN). Kryuchkov responded that this issue is being continually worked on, but no central decisions had been made as of yet.

This note on the talks between Minister Wolf and KGB Chairman Chebrikov contains heartfelt congratulations on cooperation thus far, but it also highlights problems with the situation and the importance of utilizing the potential of all fraternal organs to detect and prevent hostile plans and measures.

This brief note written by the Ministry of State Security includes a number of questions for the leadership of the KGB in the USSR, such as whether other elements, like military doctrine or emergency responses, should be examined as possible options for starting a war.

Assessment by the Stasi of the espionage of the main Western secret services in East Germany based on its investigation of cases of spying in 1961.

Assessment by the Stasi of changes to operations made by the main Western secret services in response to Khrushchev's November 1958 diplomatic note to the United States, Britain, and France demanding an end to the occupation of West Berlin.

Meeting between the head of the KGB’s Fifth Chief Directorate, Major General Abramov, and Minister for State Security Mielke, especially on changes in Soviet policy following Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power. They discuss the increase in dissident activity, public demonstrations, and subversive organizations.

Memorandum summarizing consultations between the Stasi and KGB over RYAN (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie, or “nuclear weapon attack”), an intelligence program initiated by the KGB to collect indicators of a potential nuclear first-strike by the US. The KGB had developed a new system for the early detection of war preparations for a first-strike attack, which should provide evidence of such preparations on the basis of “objective” indicators that would be hard to manipulate.

Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.