The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

Pinto describes two recent speeches, one by Kennedy the other by Castro, and appears to give more credit and praise to the speech by Castro. He also discusses the Cuban crisis situation in general.

Brazil's embassy in Moscow discusses visits by Novotny, Ulbricht and Gomulka to Moscow and says that there is the impression that the recent international events have created a state of disorientation in the community of socialist countries and that the great challenge of Khrushchev will be to accommodate this state of affairs in the short term.

The Brazilian Embassy in Poland discusses Poland's sympathy on the Brazilian motion in the United Nations about the denuclearization and its favorable reflection in a solution of the Cuban crisis.

Campos discusses diplomatic gestures between Brazil, the United States and Cuba during the Cuban crisis and some misunderstandings that may have emerged during that time.

The Brazilian government offers elements of their Armed Forces for collaboration in the blockade of Cuba, authorized by the OAS and executed by the American government. Brazil does so for three reasons: their affirmative vote on the blockade in the OAS, most Latin American countries have contributed armed forces and it is a gesture of cooperate with the United States.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells Brazilian officials about letters that have been sent between Kennedy and Khrushchev discussing missile bases in both Cuba and Turkey.

Barreiros meets with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and others to discuss the Cuban crisis, messages between President Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the position of Brazil in the next meeting of the OAS Organ of Consultation.