Deputy Minister Winiewicz recounts his conversation with Ambassador Beam, in which Winiewicz replies to the American note concerning the Rapacki Plan by asserting the Polish intention to continue pursuing the Plan. Beam assures Winiewicz of the American interest in positive relations with Poland.

The Polish Embassy in Washington reports on the negative American opinion of the Rapacki Plan, as well as calls for free elections in eastern Europe.

Adam Rapacki, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, discusses the Polish Plan and the Soviet proposal for a meeting of various heads of state.

The Polish Foreign Ministry informs its diplomats in Moscow, Budapest, Prague, and Bucharest about the French Prime Minister's interview criticizing the Rapacki Plan.

This message summarizes responses to the Rapacki Plan from countries in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and North America.

Cable from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, reporting his meeting with a US official "Henry" (not Cabot Lodge), where they discuss Maneli's meeting with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Notes that it was an attempt to establish contact between US and Polish officials in Vietnam.

Cable from Adam Rapacki to the Polish representative in Moscow informing him of Jerzy Michałowski’s coming arrival in Moscow, in light of recent Soviet-US and Polish-US talks on South Vietnam.

Jelen continues his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."