Skip to content

Results:

31 - 40 of 60

Documents

November 8, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 8 November 1962

Jelen reports on the talks regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially the issues coming from the Cuban side of the talks.

November 3, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

In a conversation between Drozniak and Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, Rostow compares "the initial stages of the armed conflict in Cuba to the [Japanese attacks on] Pearl Harbor [on 7 December 1941]. [He said that President] Kennedy was ready for war. The most pressing issue at the moment is a quick removal of the [Soviet] missiles from Cuba."

November 3, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

Drozniak reports on the information from several sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly the White House and State Department's reactions to the agreement to dismantle the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the continued trouble they are having with Castro's refusal to allow UN inspections.

November 1, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Jaszczuk), 1 November 1962

Based on the conversation between Paszkowski and Deputy Director of United States Department in the Ministry of International Affairs Sergey Kudryavstev, Jaszczuk describes the situation between the US, the USSR and Cuba after the recent talks and says that "We need to wait a few days for the results of the talks regarding Cuba" to take effect.

November 1, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Jaszczuk), 1 November 1962

Jaszczuk thinks that the public announcements that the US will not invade Cuba are a good start, but that they need to be "encapsulated in some kind of an international document."

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, confirms Drozniak's previous telegram report that " In [Schlesinger's] opinion, the assessment of the Soviet installation of the missiles in Cuba as the attempt to strengthen the [world] position of the USSR before a possible confrontation over Berlin, ended up prevailing within the US administration."

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Jaszczuk), 31 October 1962

US Ambassador Foy D. Kohler tells Jaszczuk that "The United States will not go into Cuba and it does not intend to topple Castro from outside of Cuba."

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 30 October 1962

Drozniak reports on information about the Cuban Missile Crisis - the US administration's opinion on Soviet missiles in Cuba, liquidating Guantanamo Base and missiles in Turkey.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 30 October 1962

Jelen continues his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Jaszczuk), 30 October 1962

Jaszczuk discusses the Cuban Missile Crisis, saying "The situation of the past few days has been exceptionally tense. We were on the brink of war. The USSR had information about an imminent invasion of Cuba."

Pagination