Boissevain reports on the ongoing cold war between the United States and Cuba and its effect on Cuban society. Cuba's national airport is maintaining service to Mexico city but is marked by continued delays and cancellations. Trade is limited only to Cuban and Spanish ships flying under the flag of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Kennedy's latest address heralds more hardship for the Cuban people. The letter concludes with the prospect of Japan buying Cuban sugar based on a meeting with Japanese Ambassador to Cuba Rokuzo Yaguchi.

Boissevain writes to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs on the status of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. There are reports of hidden missiles within Cuba, buried in underground fortifications by the Soviets. He attaches confidential information that details the locations and means of concealment of these missiles.

Boissevain reports to Amsterdam the current domestic situation in Cuba, with attention being paid to Havana. In his words, Cuba is "on a war footing," and describes the various posters with propagandistic slogans urging the people to stand strong against a possible American invasion.

The letter begins with Boissevain criticizing Castro's speech, claiming he could have written it before it was ever delivered. The speech concerned Castro's meeting with UN Secretary General U Thant, and the contents of the speech were such that the Cuban people were kept at boiling point. Boissevain claims this is a necessity to make the people accept the sacrifices demanded of them and forget the hardships they face. Castro's exclamations that "we are above all Marxist-Leninists" raised applause, but Soviet support has died down. Boissevain suspects Anastas Mikoyan will have a hard time reasoning with Castro after the disappointment in the eyes of Cuba.

Boissevain writes a cable detailing a meeting between Fidel Castro and UN Secretary General U Thant. Cuba refused any inspection of missile silos, if the Americans did not uphold their pledge to not threaten Cuba with invasion. The Five Points were mentioned as preconditions for peace and Castro pledged Cuba was ready and willing to work towards peace. It appears Castro was aware of Soviet considerations for "global politics" as the reason behind the Soviet withdrawal of missiles.

Boissevain reports on the aftermath of the crisis and its effects on Cuba, especially in Havana. Rather than the majority being in support of government actions while a minority supported the opposition, there is a public outcry from the masses about the Soviet handling of the crisis. Fidel Castro's response is a speech to the people explaining the Soviet reasons for their actions, while the Soviet Union voices its support for Castro's Five Points and sends Anastas Mikoyan to Havana as a "troubleshooter."