KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov presents a secret, 33-page report to the CPSU Central Committee about the mood of Soviet college students. The report had been completed sometime before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and had been circulating within the KGB. It is not clear precisely who drafted the report, but Andropov’s cover memorandum and the report itself indicate that the author was a college student in Odessa who had recently finished his degree.

Includes memo of 20 January 1971.

The following CPSU Central Committee document, dated 1 April 1979 and signed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, KGB chief Yurii Andropov, and CC International Department head Boris Ponomarev, provides a strikingly candid assessment of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan that the Soviet Politburo confronted in spring 1979. The report attributes the increasing success of the Islamic opposition (i.e., the Afghan Mujaheddin) to the “miscalculations and mistakes” of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) regime that seized power following the April 1978 “revolution.”

Yearly report by KGB Chief Andropov to the CPSU leadership on the actions taken by the KGB in the field of espionage, counter-espionage, and counter-propaganda.

Yuri Andropov forwards this letter from Hungarian Prime Minister Andras Hegedus to the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The letter requests Soviet troops to quell the riots in Budapest.

Andropov reports that Imre Nagy has threatened a scandal and the resignation of the government if the Soviet Union continues to send troops into Hungary. In his meeting with Nagy, Andropov is told that Hungary is withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and will further request a UN guarantee of Hungarian neutrality if Soviet troop movements into Hungary do not stop. The report notes that after the meeting the Hungarian government informed the Embassy of its decision to leave the Warsaw Pact.

Memorandum to the CPSU Politburo from the Suslov Commission regarding a request by the Soviet Ministry of Defense to bring up to full readiness 3 divisions of the Soviet Armed Forces. The memorandum cautions the Soviet leadership that, in case the Polish Armed Forces switch allegiance to the counter-revolutionary forces, another 5-7 divisions might be necessary.

The Politburo approves the results of a meeting of Warsaw Pact officials. Kania offers assurances that PZPR will be able to control the Polish crisis on its own.

There is a mention of the several different secretaries of different communist countries—Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Korea. The need to improve economic situations and living standards in all countries is addressed, including the rebuilding of areas destroyed in the Korean war.

In this report Andropov describes the successes of the KGB and Cheka in subverting the infiltration of counterintelligence of NATO countries and Solidarity in the Soviet Union.